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COPYRIGHT PERMISSION SYSTEMS
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution
gives Congress the power:
to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discov-
eries.1
This clause is the constitutional authority for congressional
enactment of the Copyright Act.2 Of all the powers granted to
Congress in Section 8, Clause 8 is the only clause that has an
expressly stated purpose: "to promote the Progress of Science and
the useful Arts.? The clause also expressly states the means for
achieving that purpose: granting limited monopoly rights to
authors.4
Copyright law in this country is often spoken of as a balance
between the rights granted to copyright owners and the rights
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
This clause is also the basis of Congress' authority to enact the Patent Act. The clause
should be read distributively with "Science," "Authors," and "Writings" representing the
copyright portion of the clause, and "useful Arts," "Inventors," and "Discoveries" representing
the patent portion. Thus, for copyright, Congress has the power "to promote the Progress
of Science... by securing for limited Times to Authors... the exclusive Right to their...
Writings" and for patents Congress has the power "to promote the Progress of... useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to ... Inventors the exclusive Right to their ...
Discoveries." The clause is referred to as the Copyright Clause, the Patent Clause or the
Intellectual Property Clause depending on the circumstances. Edward C. Walterscheid, To
Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The Background and Origin of the
Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 1 n.1
(1994).
3 It is possible to view Clause 1 of Section 8 as having an expressly stated purpose as
well. Clause 1 gives Congress the power to: "lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the
United States.... ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. It has been argued that Congress may only
collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises in order to pay the debts and provide for the
common defense and general welfare of the United States, but this view is not universally
accepted. See La Croix v. United States, 11 F. Supp. 817, 821 (W.D. Tenn. 1935) (adopting
the minority view that the framers intended taxes to provide for the welfare of the United
States in times of disaster).
" Cf Walterscheid, supra note 2, at 32-34 (arguing that the significance and uniqueness
in the copyright clause is not that is has a stated purpose but that it has a stated means for
achieving its express purpose).
1997]
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guaranteed to the users of copyrighted materials.5 One of the most
important counterbalances to the rights granted to copyright
owners is the right guaranteed to the users of copyrighted works to
make a "fair use" of copyrighted material.6 The right of fair use
exists to assist copyright law in fulfilling its express constitutional
purpose: the promotion of the progress of knowledge and learning.7
The right of fair use protects the public from the copyright
monopoly becoming so expansive that it stifles the very progress of
knowledge and learning that copyright law is constitutionally
mandated to promote.
Under current copyright law, the right of fair use guarantees an
important "breathing space within the confines of copyright." Yet
courts often view an assertion of fair use by a copyright defendant
5 "The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly, like the limited
copyright duration required by the Constitution, reflects a balance of competing claims upon
the public interest: Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation
must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music,
and the other arts." Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156, 186
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 65, 66 (3d Cir. 1975) (footnotes omitted) (citing Lord Mansfield: "[Wie must
take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, who
have employed their time for the service of the community, may not be deprived of their just
merits, and the reward of their ingenuity and labour; the other, that the world may not be
deprived of improvements, nor the progress of the arts be retarded.!). Any fair use analysis
"involves a difficult balance between the interests of authors and inventors in the control and
exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one hand, and society's competing
interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand." Sony Corp.
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 665, 673,
(1984). Fair use "offers a means of balancing the exclusive rights of a copyright holder with
the public's interest in dissemination of information affecting areas of universal concern, such
as art, science and industry." Wainwright Sec. Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 568 F.2d
91, 94, 194 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 401, 403 (2d Cir. 1977).
6 Throughout this article fair use is referred to as a "right." Fair use has been viewed by
some as a privilege, or an "exception," but the importance of fair use in the scheme of
copyright, discussed in Part I.D. infra, justifies its status as a right. See Leo J. Raskind, A
Functional Interpretation of Fair Use, 31 J. COPYRIGHT SOc'Y U.S.A. 601, 602-03 (1984).
7 While the text of the Constitution refers to the promotion of science, it is important to
recognize the full meaning of that term at the time of the Constitution. At that time,
"science" denoted broadly "knowledge and learning." Arthur H. Seidel, The Constitution and
a Standard of Patentability, 48 J. PAT. OFF. SOCY 1, 11 n.13 (1966) (noting that the most
authoritative dictionary at the time listed "knowledge" as the first definition of "science");
see also Walterscheid, supra note 2, at 51 & n.173. The modern connotation of "science,"
meaning technical mathematical, or non-arts studies, did not begin to emerge until the
1800s. JOHN AyTO, DIcTIONARY OF WORD ORIGINS 461 (Arcade Publishing, Inc. 1990).
a Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,579,29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1961, 1965
(1994).
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suspiciously and appear to grant such a defense only grudgingly.
While there are exceptions to this generalization, courts have not
fully embraced the importance of fair use as a counterbalance to
the limited monopoly rights granted to copyright owners." After
all, it is in some ways a unique idea that the public has the right
to make certain kinds of uses 1 of another's property. 2 These
permitted uses, however, are an important part of what allows
copyright to promote knowledge and learning in the United States.
Pronounced one of the most troublesome areas of the law, the fair
use "doctrine has been said to be 'so flexible as virtually to defy
definition.' "' Several scholars have suggested that fair use
should only be found where there is a market failure. 4 In the
9 See infra Part III.
10 See infra Part V.
" That someone other than the copyright owner has the right to make certain uses of a
work should not be viewed as odd. Property rules are, after all, a cultural creation.
Copyright is entirely a statutory right, the bounds of which are determined by statute and
by judicial interpretation of that statute. Copyright is not based on any natural law right
of the author. L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A
LAW OF USERS' RIGHTS 109-122 (1991). Copyright is a bargain struck between the public and
the author of a work. The public gives up some, but not all, rights to the work that would
otherwise exist if the work were a true public good, see infra section II, in return for more
works to enjoy, and an ultimate freedom to use the works created in any way after a
copyright has expired. "Copyright is a bargain with the public; not a natural right." Richard
Stallman, Reevaluating Copyright: The Public Must Prevail, 75 OR. L. REV. 291, 293 (1996).
' While we often refer to copyright as property, "it wears the property label uneasily."
L. Ray Patterson, Copyright and the 'Exclusive Right" of Authors, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1,
37 (1993). As the Supreme Court has recognized, "[tihe copyright owner ... holds no
ordinary chattel." United States v. Dowling, 473 U.S. 207,216,226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 529,533
(1985). Copyright is more regulatory in nature. Patterson, supra, at 41. It is a limited
statutory monopoly, with its scope defined by those rights that the public must forego during
some limited time in order to provide the incentive necessary to encourage the production
of new works.
"Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1392, 40
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1650 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1336 (1997)
(citing Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assoc., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144, 159 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 663, 674
(S.D.N.Y. 1968)). As the Senate recognized when passing the Copyright Act of 1976:
Although the courts have considered and ruled upon the fair use doctrine
over and over again, no real definition of the concept has ever emerged.
Indeed, since the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no generally
applicable definition is possible, and each case raising the question must be
decided on its own facts.
S. REP. No. 94-473, at 65 (1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. (90 Stat.) 5659, 5679.
14 See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 CoLuI. L. REv. 1600 (1982); Michael
G. Anderson & Paul F. Brown, The Economics Behind Copyright Fair Use: A Principled and
Predictable Body of Law, 24 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 143 (1993); Raskind, supra note 6.
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context of copyright law the market can fail for several reasons:
high transaction costs associated with achieving a market bar-
gained-for, high externalities that cannot be internalized in a
bargain exchange, or the existence of non-monetizable interests
that are not factored into the bargain by the parties. 5
Recently two appellate courts have twisted the market failure
theory of fair use on its head, rejecting the fair use defense largely
because of the apparent absence of one type of market failure.
These courts neglected to fully appreciate the type of market failure
that is more central to copyright and the fair use doctrine today.
In Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services,
Inc.,16 and American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc.," the
courts rejected claims of fair use because the copyright owners had
established permission systems for licensing the types of uses at
issue. The plaintiffs in these cases argued that if there is a simple,
efficient system to obtain permission for the use at issue, then the
claim of fair use should be denied. In both of these cases the courts
were persuaded by the plaintiffs' arguments, holding that because
there was a way to pay for the use, and the defendants did not pay
for a license, the plaintiffs had suffered "market harm," an often
determinative finding in fair use cases.
A permission system only remedies the market failure that
occurs because of high transaction costs. A permission system does
nothing to cure the kind of market failure that is more central to
the purpose of fair use and the constitutional purpose of copyright:
the market failure that occurs when there are significant external
benefits associated with a particular use that cannot be internal-
ized in any bargained-for exchange. The types of uses that fair use
is designed to permit are exactly those uses that have significant
external benefits that are spread across society as a whole.'"
The adoption of the view that no fair use should be found if the
copyright owner has set up a "permission system" to license such
use threatens the constitutionally mandated goal of copyright law
which is to promote the progress of knowledge and learning. Under
"Gordon, supra note 14, at 1627-1630.
16 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1336 (1997).
17 60 F.3d 913, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. diemissed, 116 S. Ct. 592
(1995).
'a See infra Part IV.
[Vol. 5:1
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this narrowed market failure view of fair use, if a copyright owner
can establish an efficient "permission system" to collect fees for a
certain kind of use, then the copyright owner will be able to defeat
a claim of fair use. This limited view of fair use has the potential
to allow copyright owners to control all uses of their works, thereby
eliminating the necessary "breathing space" in copyright law.
The overemphasis on monetary issues and permission systems by
lower courts deciding fair use cases without full consideration of the
external benefits of the use at issue has led judges to treat fair use
as the step-child of copyright law.19 This second-class treatment
of the right of fair use is particularly apparent with what are
labeled non-transformative uses.20 Under the current scheme of
copyright, granting ever broader rights to copyright holders for ever
longer periods of time,2' the guarantee of the right of fair use
must be protected and even expanded.22 If courts are going to
employ a market failure approach to fair use, a complete recogni-
tion of all the potential types of market failures that can occur
relating to uses of copyrighted works is critical to maintaining the
appropriate balance in copyright law. The goal of this Article is to
further that understanding by exploring the use and misuse of the
See infra Part III.
so A transformative use is considered to be a use of elements or portions of a pre-existing
work in such a way that it recasts or transforms the earlier work in some way. Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). A parody of an earlier work is an
example of a transformative use. A non-transformative use, on the other hand, is a use that
does not involve any transformation of the authorship elements of the pre.existing work.
Photocopying an article from a magazine or a chapter from a book are often thought of as
examples of non-transformative uses. See 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 10.2.2[c] (2d ed.
1996). This Article argues that some non-transformative uses are as important as
transformative uses and should be permitted as fair uses, even if there is a 'permission
system" in place for the particular use at issue.
" The first Copyright Act in this country provided for copyright protection for a maximum
of 28 years (two 14 year terms). Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, (repealed 1802)
reprinted in 5 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NEMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT app. at
7(DX1Xa) (1997). Currently, for a work created by a single author, the monopoly of the
copyright lasts for the life of the author plus 50 years, 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1994), with proposals
pending in Congress to lengthen that base duration to the life of the author plus 75 years.
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1997, H.R. 604 and S. 505, 105th Cong., 1st Seas. (1997).
' In making this call for expansion, I join others who have urged the same in the past.
See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Copyright & Information Policy, 55 LAW & CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEMS 185, 207 & n.2 (1992) (urging that fair use be 'reinvigorated"); PATTERSON &
LINDBERG, supra note 11, at 196-222.
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market failure approach in fair use cases especially in the context
of permission systems and non-transformative fair uses.
In understanding how courts have applied and misapplied the
market failure approach to fair use, it is critical to understand the
historical origins not only of fair use, but of copyright law itself.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the fair use doctrine
in the United States, first placing copyright law in historical
perspective from its English origins as a tool of trade regulation
and censorship. Part II describes the application of economic
analysis to copyright generally and to fair use in particular. Part
III explores how and why lower courts have overemphasized
monetary considerations, the existence of permission systems, and
why fair uses can and should include uses that would not be
categorized as "transformative." Part III goes on to discuss the two
recent courts of appeals cases finding permission systems to be
persuasive evidence of market harm and the problems associated
with adopting this kind of approach to fair use cases. Part IV
explores the more central type of market failure that courts must
fully consider in determining whether a particular use is fair: the
inability to internalize the diffuse but extensive external public
benefit of certain kinds of uses.
I. OVERVIEW OF COPYRIGHT AND FAIR USE
When Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1976,23 it made the
rights of copyright owners "subject to" the rights of fair users,2'
and it codified the judicially created doctrine of fair use as a right
that exists "notwithstanding" the rights granted to copyright
owners.2" In light of the importance of promoting access to, and
fair use of, copyrighted works, Congress declared that a fair use "is
17 U.S.C. § 101 et. seq. (1994).
24 Section 106 of the Copyright Act begins the grant of rights to the copyright owner with
the phrase [s]ubject to sections 107 through 120," thus making all the rights of copyright
owners expressly subject to the rights of users specified in 14 different sections of the
Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
' Section 107 of the Copyright Act guarantees the right of fair use. That section begins
by clearly indicating that the fair use right exists "[nlotwithstanding the provisions of
sections 106 and 106A," the two sections granting rights to copyright owners and authors,
respectively. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
[Vol. 5:1
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not an infringement of copyright."26 While the statutory language
clearly emphasizes the importance of the rights of users, including
the right of fair use, to fully understand the doctrine's importance,
one must first understand the origins of not only fair use, but the
historical origins of the copyright law.
A. COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The historical antecedent of American copyright is the English
Statute of Anne, often spoken of as the "first" copyright act. The
Statute of Anne, however, is only the first parliamentary copyright
act and was the culmination of over 200 years of regulation of the
publishing trade. The introduction of the printing press in the late
fifteenth century created a new trade to be regulated and con-
trolled. The English printers, booksellers, and bookbinders had
been organized as a guild for nearly 100 years prior to the introduc-
tion of the printing press27 and the guild likely had practices and
rules that prohibited one member from copying another member's
printed work without permission.2" After the introduction of the
printing press in England, such rules of the guild became increas-
ingly important.
The rules governing the members of the guild were, however,
nothing more than a gentleman's agreement that could be enforced
only among the guild's own membership. Because of this private
law characteristic, there existed the threat that a publisher who
was not a member of the guild would copy a work previously
published by a member, leaving the member with no recourse.
This threat caused the publishers to seek ways of making their
private law enforceable against non-members as well.' Printing
patents offered one method of enforcement beyond the members of
the guild, but such letters patent were granted by the sovereign at
26 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
" In 1403, "the Mayor and Aldermen of London granted a petition by the writers of
textletter, illuminators, bookbinders, and booksellers to form a guild." LYMAN RAY
PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN THE HISTORICAL PERSPEcTIVE 29 (1968).
2 Id. at 4.
29 As early as 1542 the guild had requested a royal charter from the Crown. CYPRIAN
BLAGDEN, THE STATIONERS' COMPANY: A HISTORY, 1403-1959, 28 (1960).
1997]
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his royal prerogative." The printing patent was limited to a
favored few and its importance diminished throughout the seven-
teenth century.3'
The decline in importance of the printing patent was accompa-
nied by a rise in importance of the second method of enforcement
beyond the members of guild-the creation of the royally chartered
Stationers' Company. During the mid-sixteenth century, the desires
of the booksellers for greater enforcement ability coincided with the
desires of the crown "to gain control over 'the dangerous possibili-
ties of the printed word' " and "to prevent the publication of
'seditious, heretical, and schismatical' materials ...... The
result was the grant of a royal charter in 1557 that reserved the
printing of most works to members of the Stationers' Company and
granted the Company the right to discover and destroy unlawfully
printed books. 33 While the booksellers were interested in protect-
3o Walterscheid, supra note 2, at 13. While the exact terms of each printing patent could
be varied, a printing patent gave the holder of the patent a monopoly over the printing of the
work specified. PATTERSON, supra note 27, at 78-81.
31 PATrERSON, supra note 27, at 80.
3 PArTRsoN & LINDBERG, supra note 11, at 23.
33 The royal charter authorized:
[Tihe Master and Keepers or Wardens... to make search whenever it shall
please them in any place, shop house, chamber, or building of any printer,
binder or bookseller whatever within our kingdom of England or the
dominions of the same of or for any books or things printed, or to be printed,
and to seize, take, hold, burn, or turn to the proper use of the foresaid
community, all and several those books and things which are or shall be
printed contrary to the form of any statute, act or proclamation, made or to
be made; and that if any person shall practise [sic] or exercise the foresaid art
or mistery [sic] contrary to the foresaid form, or shall disturb, refuse, or
hinder the foresaid Master or Keepers or Wardens for the time being or any
one of them for the time being, in making the foresaid search or in seizing,
taking, or burning the foresaid books or things, or any of them printed or to
be printed contrary to the form of any statute, act, or proclamation, that then
the foresaid Master and Keepers or Wardens for the time being shall
imprison or commit to jail any such person so practising [sic] or exercising
the foresaid art or mistery [sic] contrary to the foresaid form, or as is stated
above, disturbing, refusing or hindering, there to remain without bail for the
space of three months; and that the same person so practising [sic] or
exercising the foresaid art or mistery [sic] contrary to the aforesaid form, or
so as is above stated, disturbing, refusing or hindering, shall forfeit for each
such practising [sic] or exercising aforesaid against the form aforesaid and for
each such disturbance, refusal or hindrance a hundred shillings of lawful
money of England, one half thereof to us, the heirs and successors of us the
10
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ing their monopoly, the crown was interested in censorship. The
stationer's copyright served both purposes well, permitting the
booksellers a monopoly on registered titles and permitting the
crown control over the printed word through the ability to destroy
books it viewed as heretical.
The royal charter was preceded by several proclamations and
followed by several Star Chamber decrees, all directed at control-
ling the printed word.3 4 The Licensing Act of 1662 continued the
regime of press control using the members of the Stationers'
Company both as policemen and as enforcers. The purpose of these
first copyright decrees and acts was the promotion of the crown's
censorship carried out under the guise of the stationers' monopoly
on book publishing. In 1694, the last of the legally sanctioned
censorship acts ended and the stationers were unsuccessful in
convincing Parliament to reinstate their control.3
Subsequent to their defeat in Parliament, the stationers then
changed their tactics and sought to obtain legal protection for
writings on behalf of authors, who, of course, would have to assign
their rights to the publishers in order to be paid.' This strategy
foresaid Queen, and the other half thereof to the foresaid Master, Keepers or
Warden and community.
PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 11, at 247-48 n.9 (quoting A TRANSCRIPT OF THE
REGISTERS OF THE COMPANY OF STATIONERS OF LONDON 1554-1640 AD. 1:xxviii-xxxii
(Edward Arber ed., London, Privately Printed 1875-94)).
"See PATTERSON, supra note 27, at 114-126 (discussing the Star Chamber decrees of
1586 and 1637).
"By its terms, the Licensing Act of 1662 was to remain in force for only two years but
Parliament renewed the act from session to session "until the dissolution of the Cavalier
Parliament." Id. at 138. It was revived again in 1685 and "renewed for the last time in
1692." Id. at 139. The members of the Stationers' Company tried repeatedly to revive the
licensing act without success. Id. at 139-42.
' Id. at 142. The focus on authors as the statutory benefactors of copyright is a concept
that continues through today. Prior to 1978, authors were not even entitled to federal
copyright until publication, which typically meant involving a publisher in the process.
While authors remain the initial recipient of copyright today, in order to effectively distribute
and commercialize their works authors often are forced to assign their copyrights to
publishers. See, e.g., American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 915 (2d Cir.
1994) (noting that the authors in that case were required to assign their copyrights in order
to have their works published). With the increase of digital technology much of the
traditional relationship between author and publisher may be dramatically altered. See, e.g.,
Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Serva., Inc., No. 94-1778 1996 WL 54741, at
*17 (6th Cir. Feb. 12, 1996) (Nelson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ('electronic
samizdats may turn out to be the wave of the future") vacated and rev'd, 99 F.3d 1381 (6th
11
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was successful and in 1710 Parliament enacted the Statute of Anne
which granted an assignable right to authors to control the
publication of their writings.3 7 This new copyright act, however,
was fundamentally different from the previous proclamations in
two important ways. Instead of a tool of censorship, the copyright
monopoly under the Statute of Anne was expressly meant to be, as
its preamble stated, "[a]n act for the encouragement of learning."
Additionally, copyright under the Statute of Anne was of limited
duration (two fourteen-year terms), whereas previously it had
endured in perpetuity. While the Statute of Anne continued the
ability of publishers to monopolize the printing of books, it also
created the concept of the public domain-after the copyright
expired, anyone was free to use a work in any manner without
needing permission from the copyright owner.39 The Statute of
Anne clearly rejected copyright as a tool of censorship and instead
focused copyright on advancing learning.
England had taken centuries to arrive at a copyright law that
embodied a public purpose and reduced the threat that copyright
could be used as a tool for government censorship. This history
was not lost on the framers of the Constitution who expressly
incorporated into the Constitution the concept that copyright must
serve a public purpose.4 ° The Constitution provides that the
monopoly of the copyright must "promote the Progress of Science
Cir. 1996) (en banc).
The justification for vesting copyright protection in authors generally is based on two
notions. First, that copyright provides the incentive for authors to create socially valuable
works. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,429 (1984). Second,
that authors deserve rewards for their acts of creation regardless of their particular
motivation in creating a work. Maser v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219, 100 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 325
(1954). These justifications have been attacked in recent literature. See Stewart E. Sterk,
Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197 (1996).
"7 While the publishers would have preferred that the copyright be granted only to
publishers, an assignable right granted to authors was better than no protection at all.
sa An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 1710, 8 Anne, ch. 19 (Eng.).
"PATrERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 11, at 28-31.
o Very little is actually known about how the copyright clause came to be included in the
Constitution. John Madison noted that the clause was adopted with no debate and no
dissent. walterscheid, supra note 2, at 26 & n.87. Given the distrust of monopolies at the
time of the convention, see infra note 58, it is possible that the framers viewed the language
setting forth the public purpose necessary to justify vesting Congress with the power to grant
such monopolies. Cf Walterscheid, supra note 2, at 56 (asserting that at the time of
ratification of the Constitution, very few actually gave much thought to this clause).
[Vol. 5:1
12
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol5/iss1/2
COPYRIGHT PERMISSION SYSTEMS
and the useful Arts."'1 Importantly, "science" in the seventeenth
century broadly denoted knowledge and learning.42 Censorship
was not present in any form. The first Congress also embodied the
educational purpose in the first copyright act entitled "An Act for
the encouragement of learning ..... 43
Granting limited monopolies was seen as one of the most
economically feasible ways for the fledgling nation to provide an
incentive for the creation and dissemination of new works which
would thereby promote education, learning, and democracy itself.44
Today, a fundamental precept in copyright law is that the rights
granted to individuals by the Copyright Act "are subservient to the
Act's primary objective' of promoting the progress of knowledge
and learning.
B. THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF FAIR USE
The historical origins of the current fair use doctrine also began
in England. The doctrine that we now label fair use, began in the
English cases as the doctrine of fair abridgment. The early
copyright laws both in England and in the United States protected
only the printing and vending of the exact work. Although not
expressly stated in the early statutes, courts considered transla-
tions and abridgments to be new works of authorship deserving of
their own protection and typically not requiring the consent of the
41 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
See Seidel, supra note 7, at 11-12 & n.14.
"The Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
In adopting the first Copyright Act, the Senate emphasized that "[l]iterature and
[skcience are essential to the preservation of a free Constitution .... I BRUCE W. BUGBEE,
THE GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAw 137 (1967) (quoting U.S. Senate
Journal, 1st Cong., 2d Sess., 8-10; 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 935-36 (972 in some copies) (Joseph
Gales ed., 1789)). The alternatives might include government subsidies to creators of works
of authorship or a system of patronage. Both of these methods for encouraging advancement
in the arts and sciences have their own problems. See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for
Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV.
L. REV. 281,302-08 (1970) (discussing the problems of government subsidies and patronage).
"Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1393 (6th Cir. 1996)
(Martin, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1336 (1997). See also Twentieth Century
Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (stating that "private motivation must
ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the
other arts").
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copyright owner of the original work.' For example, one of the
first English cases finding a fair abridgment involved the defend-
ant's unauthorized use of 35 out of the original 275 sheets of
plaintiffs work.47 The rationale expressed for permitting a fair
abridgment of copyrighted works "was that the second author,
through a good faith productive use of the first author's work, had,
in effect, created a new, original work that would itself promote the
progress of science and thereby benefit the public.'
The first seeds of fair use as opposed to fair abridgment appear
in Cary v. Kearsley,49 where Lord Ellenborough, sitting with a
jury, was faced with the assertion that plaintiff's book detailing
various places, roads, and the distance between places, had been
infringed by the defendant's work. Prior to putting the case to the
jury, the court remarked:
That part of the work of one auther [sic] is found in
another, is not of itself piracy, or sufficient to support an
action; a man may fairly adopt part of the work of
another: he may so make use of another's labours for
the promotion of science, and the benefit of the public:
but having done so, the question will be, was the matter
so taken used fairly with that view, and without what
I may term the animus furandi....?o
In Cary, Lord Ellenborough also proclaimed the often quoted
statement: "[W]hile I shall think myself bound to secure every man
in the enjoyment of his copy-right, one must not put manacles upon
" However, some of the first assertions of the right of fair abridgment met again with the
specter of censorship, this time by the courts. For example in Burnett v. Chetwood, 35 Eng.
Rep. 1008 (Ch. 1720), the court enjoined the publication and distribution of an unauthorized
English translation of the Latin work "Archaeologia Philosophica* by Dr. Thomas Burnett.
One of the excerpts included a conversation between Eve and the serpent that was of some
embarrassment to the heirs of Dr. Burnett. Although the court found that the Statute of
Anne had not been violated because the translation was a new work, it nevertheless granted
an injunction based on the Court's "superintendency over all books ... [to] restrain the
printing or publishing any that contained reflections on religion or morality." Id. at 1009.
47 WaiAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVLEGE IN CoPYRIGHT LAW 6-7 (2d ed. 1995)
(discussing the case of Gyles v. Wilcox, 26 Eng. Rep. 489 (Ch. 1740)).
"PATRY, supra note 47, at 3.
"4 Esp. 168 (1802).
'o Id. at 170 (emphasis added).
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science."51 By keeping the scope of the copyright monopoly in
check, fair abridgment represented one avenue of ensuring that
copyright encouraged, rather than hampered, knowledge and
learning.
The early English cases also evidence a concern for the com-
petitive nature of the subsequent work. As early as 1761, a
defendant asserting the defense of fair abridgment emphasized that
his use did not supplant the sale of the original work, but rather
assisted its sale. 2 As the doctrine evolved, and fair use entered
the vocabulary of the case law, if the defendant's subsequent work
harmed the market for the original work by competing against it,
the court was more inclined to find infringement. Even in the
context of a review of the original work, the courts held that if, in
the review, "so much is extracted that it communicates the same
knowledge with the original work, it is an actionable violation of
literary property."53
C. FAIR USE ORIGINS: EXPANDING LIMITED RIGHTS OF COPYRIGHT
OWNERS
The English fair abridgment doctrine was never fully accepted in
American courts. Instead, the doctrine was treated as a precedent
to be limited." Justice Story's opinion in Folsom v. Marsh is
recognized as the first articulation of fair use in the United
States.' In Folsom, the defendant was found to have copied 353
1 Id. at 171. Ultimately, given the judge's comments in Cary, the plaintiff agreed to a
nonsuit, before the case was given to the jury. PATRY, supra note 47, at 10.
Dodsley v. Kinnersley, 27 Eng. Rep. 270 (Ch. 1761).
Roworth v. Wilkes, 170 Eng. Rep. 889, 890 (KB. 1807). For a more detailed review of
the development of the fair abridgment and later the fair use doctrine in English case law,
see PATRY, supra note 47, at 6-18.
"See, e.g., Gray v. Russell, 10 F. Cas. 1035, 1038 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 5,728) (stating
that "[a]lthough the doctrine is often laid down in the books, that an abridgment is not a
piracy.., yet this proposition must be received with many qualifications"); see also, L. Ray
Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REv. 1, 39 (1987).
"9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901). Justice Story had earlier expressed in
dicta many of the points articulated in Folsom. See Gray, 10 F. Cas. at 1038-39. While
Folsom is typically considered to be the first fair use case, nowhere in the opinion does the
phrase "fair use" appear. During the nineteenth century there were only nine reported cases
that used the phrase "fair use." Laura G. Lape, Transforming Fair Use: The Productive Use
Factor in Fair Use Doctrine, 58 ALB. L. REV. 677, 680 & n.14 (1995).
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pages of the plaintiffs work, a 12-volume, 7,000-page biography of
George Washington. In deliberating on whether the claimed use
was an infringement, Justice Story phrased the appropriate inquiry
as follows:
In short, we must often, in deciding questions of this
sort, look to the nature and objects of the selections
made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and
the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or
diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the
original work."
Because the first Copyright Act in the United States gave a
copyright owner only the right of "printing, reprinting, publishing
and vending" the copyrighted work,57 the judicially created fair
use doctrine actually created an expansion of the rights given to the
copyright owner. If the new work was found not to be a fair use,
the copyright owner could prohibit its publication, despite the fact
that it was not a verbatim printing of the copyrighted work. In
other words, by showing that a particular publication was not a
"fair use," the copyright owner could prohibit uses that were not
otherwise within the grant of exclusive rights. Arguably, the
conclusion that a particular work was not a fair use but rather was
an infringement, equaled, in this context, a conclusion that the
defendant had used too much of the original work such that the
defendant was, in fact, reprinting the copyrighted work.
D. FAIR USE TODAY: LIMITING BROADER RIGHTS OF COPYRIGHT
OWNERS
The founding fathers, while inherently suspicious of all monop-
olies,' believed that granting copyright protection for creative
"9 F. Cas. at 348.
' 1 Stat. at 124-26. Translations of a work into a different language were not considered
copyright infringement. See, e4g., Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No.
13,514 ) (holding that the German translation of Uncle Tom's Cabin was not an infringement
of the copyright in the original work). See also, Sayre v. Moore, 1 East. 361, 102 Eng. Rep.
138, 139 (KB. 1801) (1785) (suggesting improved map could be noninfringing because of the
alteration).
"An early objection to the Constitution was that it did not contain an express prohibition
on the granting of monopolies. See Walterscheid, supra note 2, at 37-38 n.124 & 55-56.
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works would be the most effective vehicle for providing the
economic incentive, "the engine of free expression," 9 and a tool of
democracy.60 The balance struck between copyright owners' rights
and copyright users' rights in the first copyright acts protected the
expression but left the ideas expressed free for anyone to copy.
This was the only balance needed because the first copyright acts
protected only against the unauthorized printing and vending of an
entire work. Early copyright acts did not protect against the
unauthorized preparation of abridgments, the copying of portions
of a work for personal use, or the preparation of derivative works
as that term is now defined under the Copyright Act.6 1 Addition-
ally, the idea/expression balance was appropriate given the limited
duration of a maximum of 28 years.62 Today, however, copyright
provides greater protection than simply preventing the printing and
vending of exact replicas of an entire work, and the duration of
copyright has increased dramatically.'
Subsequent to the first Copyright Act passed in 1790," there
were three revision acts in 1802,6 18316 and 1870.7 In 1909
Congress passed the "watershed statute of American copyright.'
The 1909 Act awarded copyright owners of literary works a new
exclusive right: The right to copy the copyrighted work. Section
" Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558, 225 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 1073, 1080 (1985).
60 Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283,
288-89 (1996).
6' See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (defining a derivative work as "a work based upon one or
more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization,
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment,
condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted").
" Originally copyright had the potential to endure only for a maximum of 28 years (two
14-year terms). The Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
' Presently copyright typically lasts for the life of the author plus fifty years, or between
seventy-five and one hundred years for works made for hire and for works published
anonymously or under a pseudonym. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1994).
Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1802).
Act of April 29, 1802, ch. 36, 2 Stat. 171 (repealed 1831).
"Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (repealed 1870).
67 Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 (repealed 1909).
68 PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 11, at 77. In passing the 1909 Copyright Act,
Congress again noted that copyright was '[nlot primarily for the benefit of the author, but
primarily for the benefit of the public...." H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7
(1909).
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1(a) of the act provided that "any person entitled thereto, upon
complying with the provisions of this Act, shall have the exclusive
right... to print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted
work. 9 While the right to copy did exist in the prior act, it
applied only to works of art and not to works of literature.70
Fair use was not codified as part of the 1909 Act, but remained
in judicial hands. Following Justice Story's lead in Folsom v.
Marsh,7' the lower courts continued to apply Story's formulation
of the fair use doctrine. As more rights were added to the rights
granted to copyright owners, fair use was asserted more frequently,
the amorphous doctrine being termed an "equitable rule of
reason, 72 with courts describing the fair use issue as "the most
troublesome in the whole law of copyright,"73 while copyright itself
was referred to as "the metaphysics of the law."74
6Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 1(a) 35 Stat. 1075 (emphasis added). The House report
concerning section 1(a) indicates that Congress did not think it was changing, let alone
expanding, the rights given to copyright holders:
Subsection (a) of section 1 adopts without change the phraseology of section
4952 of the Revised Statutes, and this, with the insertion of the word "copy,"
practically adopts the phraseology of the first copyright act Congress ever
passed-that of 1790. Many amendments of this were suggested, but the
committee felt that it was safer to retain without change the old phraseology
which has been so often construed by the courts.
H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 4.
70 While the creator of a work was given the "sole liberty of printing, reprinting,
publishing, completing, copying, executing, finishing and vending the same," the rights given
to the copyright owner were defined by what constituted an infringement of such work. For
books it was an infringement to "print, publish, or import' the work without perinission.
Title 60 Revised Statutes § 4964 (1873). For maps, charts, musical compositions, prints,
cuts, engravings, photographs, or cromos, however, it was an infringement to "engrave, etch,
work, copy, print, publish, or import" the work without permission. Title 60 Revised
Statutes § 4965 (1873).
71 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984) (citations
omitted).
73 Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661,662,42 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 164, 164 (2d Cir.
1939).
71 It was Justice Story himself that gave copyright such an abstract reputation: "Patents
and copyrights approach nearer than any other class of cases belonging to forensic
discussions, to what may be called the metaphysics of the law, where the distinctions are,
or at least may be, very subtile [sic] and refined, and, sometimes, almost evanescent."
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901). Today, scholars still
refer to fair use with similar epitaphs. See, e.g., MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING
COPYRIGHT LAW 319 (2d ed. 1995) (calling fair use an "elusive legal doctrine").
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The world changed rapidly in the twentieth century. Motion
pictures, radio, television, and computers stretched the existing
1909 Act to its limits. Congress began the revision process in 1955
by authorizing several studies on copyright. Whether the fair use
doctrine needed to be codified when it had existed for over a
century as a judicially created and enforced doctrine spurred
debate. Nine experts submitted their opinions concerning whether
fair use should be codified. Eight of the nine believed that fair use
did not need to be statutorily recognized. 7' Despite this early
recommendation against codification, after many debates, commit-
tee reports, and language revisions,6 Congress included section
107 in the Copyright Act of 1976, 7 which largely tracks Justice
75 The opinions of these individuals were submitted in response to an early study report
on fair use issued by the copyright office. ALAN LATMAN, SUBCOMMrITEE ON PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., STUDY No. 14 ON FAIR USE OF
COPYRIGHTED WORKS 39-44 (Comm. Print 1960). Melville B. Nimmer was the sole expert
in the advisory committee who believed that fair use deserved "express legislative
recognition." Id. at 42. Two more experts later changed their views in favor of legislative
recognition. PATRY, supra note 47, at 262 n.4.
Two copyright scholars have proposed a likely reason for Congress's codification of fair use:
"apparently [Congress] realized that, without a statement regarding fair use, the combined
weight of the other changes constituted a very real threat to the constitutional purpose of
copyright-the promotion of learning." PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 11, at 102.
7 For a comprehensive discussion of the legislative history surrounding section 107, see
PATRY, supra note 47, at 261-412.
" The statute currently provides:
§ 107. Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair use
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorec-
ords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a
fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyright-
ed work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such
finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). The final sentence of section 107 was not in the original version of
that section but was added in 1992. Act of Oct. 24, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-492, 106 Stat.
3145.
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Story's formulation of the inquiry into fair use articulated in
Folsom."8
The arguments for greater monopoly rights for copyright owners
have proven quite successful. 9 Section 106 of the 1976 Copyright
Act lists the exclusive rights granted to copyright owners.' No
longer does copyright protect only against the printing and vending
of an exact replica of an entire work, but copyright now also
78 Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 342.
" The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the tendency toward expansion of the
limited statutory monopoly of the copyright:
While the law has never recognized an author's right to absolute control of
his work, the natural tendency of legal rights to express themselves in
absolute terms to the exclusion of all else is particularly pronounced in the
history of the constitutionally sanctioned monopolies of the copyright and the
patent.
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432 n.13 (1984). The
expansion of the rights of copyright owners has occurred not only through judicial decisions,
but through legislation as well. See, e.g., Act of Nov. 1, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39 § 2, 109
Stat. 336 (adding subsection (6) to section 106 which provides a digital public performance
right for sound recordings), Act of Dec. 1, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650 § 603(a), 104 Stat. 5128
(adding section 106A granting rights of paternity and integrity to creators of works of visual
art), Act of Oct. 4, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-450, § 2, 98 Stat. 1727 (adding subsection (b) to
section 109 prohibiting the lending, rental or leasing of computer programs except by
nonprofit libraries and nonprofit educational institutions). See Mark A. Lemley, Romantic
Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEx. L. REV. 873, 886-87 (1997) (book review).
See also Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED, Jan. 1996, at 134.
80 The statute currently provides:
§ 106. Exclusive rights in copyrighted works
Subject to sections 107 through 120, the owner of copyright under this title
has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending-,
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, panto-
mimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, panto-
mimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyright-
ed work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by
means of a digital audio transmission.
17 U.S.CA. § 106 (West 1996 & Supp. 1997). Subsection (6) was added in 1995. Act of Nov.
1, 1995, Pub. L. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336. Section 106A grants certain additional rights to
authors of works of visual art as that term is defined in the Act. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1994).
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protects against: The mere reproduction of a work, independent of
whether that reproduction is sold; 1 the reproduction of portions
of a work, again independent of whether that partial reproduction
is sold; the public performance of certain types of works; 2 the
public display of certain types of work;' and the preparation of
derivative works based on a prior work.'
Because of the broader grant of exclusive rights to copyright
owners, the role that fair use plays under the current copyright act
differs considerably from the role that fair use played under
Folsom. Today, fair use keeps copyright constitutional.' Fair use
provides assurance that copyright will not stifle the very progress
in knowledge and learning that it is constitutionally mandated to
promote. Fair use also assures that copyright does not conflict with
the First Amendment." While the fair use doctrine originally
expanded the rights of copyright owners, 7 fair use now is a
critical component of copyright law that keeps the monopoly of
copyright from becoming too broad. As the Supreme Court has
recognized, "[t]he monopoly privileges [of copyright] that Congress
may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to
provide a special private benefit." s The individual rights granted
as an incentive are constitutionally authorized only so long as they
" See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Filmation Assocs., 628 F. Supp. 871, 230 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 524 (C.D. Cal. 1986). But see PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 11, at 149-159
(arguing that the right to copy is not, and should not be, an independent right).
8 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1994).
83 17 U.S.C. § 106(5) (1994).
84 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1994). Derivative works are broadly defined and include abridg-
ments, serializations, and translations. The Copyright Act of 1976 defines a derivative work
as:
[A] work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation,
musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version,
sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other
form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work
consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifica-
tions which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a
"derivative work."
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
"See PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 11, at 191.
"Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1985).
'
7 See supra Part I.C.
sSony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
1997]
21
Loren: Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of C
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 1997
22 J. INTELL. PROP. L. [Vol. 5:1
serve the purpose of promoting knowledge and learning. 9
The importance of fair use cannot be overstated. It is a "neces-
sary part of copyright law, the observance of which is essential to
achieve the goals of that law.' ° The importance of fair use
continues to grow as the rights of copyright owners expand.91
II. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, COPYRIGHT AND FAIR USE
It has been said that fair use should allow a use that "serves the
copyright objective of stimulating productive thought and public
instruction without excessively diminishing the incentives for
creativity."92 How much productive thought and public instruction
is needed? How much diminution in incentive is excessive? These
questions should underlie any fair use analysis. Many scholars
have turned to economic principles for guidance in fair use cases,
"because copyright law is based on economics."93
Clearly, our copyright law embodies an incentive-based rationale.
The protection afforded by copyright law provides the necessary
incentive to create and to disseminate copyrighted works. The
protection of copyright is necessary because the works with which
copyright is concerned are works that are public goods-they can
be used and enjoyed by an unlimited number of people without
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
8oMichael G. Anderson & Paul F. Brown, The Economics Behind Copyright Fair Use: A
Principled and Predictable Body of Law, 24 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 143, 153 (1993).
" The expansion of the rights of copyright owners can be seen in the diminishing
application of the idea-expression dichotomy, the partial repeal of the first sale doctrine, in
cases permitting copyright in what are, essentially, works of the federal government, Litman,
supra note 22, at 206 (1992), in the expansion of copyright infringement to include personal
uses of cultural works and the mere viewing of digitally stored works, and the possible
contractual enhancement of rights through licensing. Netanel, supra note 60, at 299-306.
"Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1105, 1110 (1990).
9Anastasia P. Winslow, Rapping on a Revolving Door: An Economic Analysis of Parody
and Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 767, 771 (1996). See also Gordon,
supra note 14 (advocating a market approach to guide fair use analysis); Robert P. Merges,
Are you Making Fun of Me?: Notes on Market Failure and The Parody Defense in Copyright
Law, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 305, 306 (1993) (analyzing the relationship of parody and market
failure). The Supreme Court also has recognized that the copyright clause in the
Constitution rests on an economic foundation. Sony, 464 U.S. at 429 (recognizing the
.special reward" of the copyright acts as an incentive "to motivate the creative activity of
authors"); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (referring to the "economic philosophy"
behind the constitutional clause empowering Congress to grant copyrights).
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being "used up." One person's reading of a poem in no way
diminishes the ability of another, or ten others, to read and enjoy
the very same poem. Private goods, on the other hand, once
consumed cannot be consumed by another. Additionally, public
goods are characterized by the condition that once they are created,
others cannot easily be prevented from benefitting from them.94
The incentive based rationale in copyright law is founded on the
premise that because one cannot effectively benefit from ownership
of a public good, one has little or no incentive to create or maintain
a public good.95 If anyone were free to copy works which took
months or even years to create, then the incentive to create those
works would be significantly reduced. If creators of works are
limited in their ability to capture the value that users place on
their works, the creators may not have enough incentive to invest
a socially optimal amount in their innovative and creative activi-
ty. 6 Copyright is meant to provide the protection that allows the
creators to capture at least some of the public value of their work,
thereby generating the perceived necessary incentive to encourage
creation and dissemination.
If the underlying premise of the incentive-based rationale is that
creators of works need to be able to capture at least some of the
value the public places on the work, then the next logical question
is: How much of that value should we permit a creator to capture?
Of course, in an absolute sense, all that is needed in order to
encourage production is the ability to recoup the cost of creation,
reproduction, and dissemination.97 The ability to capture value
" Public goods have two important characteristics: (1) they are virtually inexhaustible
once produced; and (2) persons who have not paid for access to the public goods, still have
access to them, nonetheless. Gordon, supra note 14, at 1610-11. A classic example of a
"public good" is a national defense. Once the national defense has been paid for it is difficult,
if not impossible, to exclude the non-paying neighbor of a paying member of society from the
benefit of that defense. As a result, a sub-optimum amount of national defense will be
purchased if left to a consensual market. Id. at 1611.
" Scholars have questioned this premise. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 44, at 302-308;
Sterk, supra note 36.
9 Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and Economics of
Intellectual Property, 5 J. ECON. PERsP. 3, 5 (1991).
9' Landes and Posner have argued that it is not certain that any copyright is needed for
authors to recover their fixed costs. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 354 (1989); see also Breyer, supra note
44.
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greater than that amount may increase the incentive to produce
and hence increase the amount of works created, but the production
of the greatest number of works is not the primary goal of copy-
right.98
One unfamiliar with copyright might suggest that the way to
obtain the greatest number of new works would be to provide the
greatest incentive possible, i.e., a copyright monopoly that is broad
in scope and lengthy in duration. However, because any work
inevitably builds on previous works, some to a greater extent than
others, providing too large a monopoly will actually hinder the
development of new works by limiting future creators use of earlier
works." Herein lies the fundamental tension in copyright law.
Copyright law does not seek to maximize the financial returns to
creators of works or to maximize the absolute number of works
created; rather, copyright law in the United States seeks to
promote the progress of knowledge and learning.1°° While knowl-
edge and learning are promoted by the creation of more works,
knowledge and learning are also promoted by a greater ability to
access and to use the works of others.
In their work on the subject of economic analysis and copyright
law, Professors Posner and Landes suggest that in attempting to
determine the appropriate scope and duration of copyright,
economic models could provide the necessary guidance. They posit
that "[flor copyright law to promote economic efficiency, its
principal legal doctrines must, at least approximately, maximize
the benefits from creating additional works minus both the losses
from limiting access and the costs of administering copyright
" To the extent that the public places additional value on a particular use, the increase
in.revenue reflects the value of that work to society and thus, more accurately reflects the
level of incentive to be given to a certain kind of work.
" Even scholars who recognize that reward to authors is not the primary goal of
copyright still assert that production of the most copyrightable works at the lowest cost is
copyright's goal. Winslow, supra note 93, at 771 n.16 & 773 n.28; Gordon, supra note 14, at
1602 n.21; William F. Patry & Shira Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued: Profit, Presump-
tions and Parody, 11 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667, 690 n.104 (1993) (noting that the
"central flaw in these economic models is that the ultimate goal of copyright is to reward
creativity, not efficiency"). Presumably these authors factor in the "cost" of the stifling effect
that too broad a monopoly can have on subsequent creation and the value of the access that
is lost by the public under broader copyright monopolies.
'o See supra Part IIA. "([Clopyright's primary goal is not allocative efficiency, but the
support of a democratic culture." Netanel, supra note 60, at 288.
[Vol. 5:1
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protection."1 ' Providing too much protection would make the
creation of new works costly and "thus, paradoxically, perhaps
lower the number of works created."' 2 There is no paradox in
this however, as the fundamental purpose of copyright is not
merely creation of new works and dissemination of those works, but
the overall enhancement of knowledge and learning, including the
freedom for new ideas and new works to build on the prior works
of others.
The rights of copyright owners under the copyright statute have
continued to expand during the history of the copyright monopoly.
Supporters of each new expansion inevitably remind those opposing
the expansion of the existing fair use doctrine, as if the mere
existence of fair use renders any expansion of the copyright
monopoly acceptable. 10 3  The comfort given by the existence of
fair use is illusory, however, because of the limited manner in
which the doctrine has been applied.
While fair use is one of the doctrines in copyright law that limits
the scope of the copyright owner's monopoly,'" how broad one
views the right of fair use to be is typically related to how broad
one believes the copyright monopoly has become. For those who
believe the copyright monopoly is too broad, it is important to have
an even broader right of fair use. For those who believe the
copyright monopoly is not broad enough, the fair use doctrine
should be a narrow "exception" to the rights of copyright own-
ers.
0 6
For those who view fair use through the lens of economic
analysis, fair use can be explained as uses that should be permitted
10 Landes & Posner, supra note 97, at 326.
02 Id. at 332.
'03 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 83-84 (1995).
104 Two other important limitations come from the limited duration of copyright and the
fundamental principle that copyright protects only the expression and not the idea being
expressed. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
" Paul Goldstein describes the two ends of the spectrum of those who view copyright's
scope as copyright optimists and copyright pessimists. Copyright optimists, who "view
copyright's cup of entitlements as always half full, only waiting to be filled still further,"
assert authors are entitled to "every last penny that other people will pay to obtain copies
of their works." PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY, FROM GUTENBERG TO THE
CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 15 (1994). Copyright pessimists, who view copyright's cup as half
empty, urge that copyright need only provide the incentive to create new works; anything
beyond that is too great. Id.
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only if there is "reason to mistrust the market."'" Only if the
market fails should a court continue to analyze whether the use at
issue is fair. If there was no market failure, then the use could not
be a fair use. Professor Gordon suggested several kinds of market
failures which could arise in the context of a fair use argument. 107
The first type of market failure is "the impossibility or difficulty of
achieving a market bargain. "10 The most common example of
such impossibility is the existence of high transaction costs in
reaching and enforcing the bargain relative to the anticipated
benefits of the bargain.
The second major type of market failure occurs as a result of
externalities and nonmonetizable interests."° When a use of a
work yields external benefits, "the market cannot be relied upon as
a mechanism for facilitating socially desirable transactions.""0
Additionally, a use may involve certain social values that are not
monetizable. For example, a use may involve a strong First
Amendment value. Such social values, while critically important
to a democratic society, do not pay well in the marketplace."'
While most articles discussing fair use in the context of market
failure identify externalities and nonmonetizable interests as
106 Gordon, supra note 14, at 1627. Copyright itself was created in part to cure a market
failure, the market failure that exists with a public good. See Winslow, supra note 93, at
773. John Cirace, When Does Complete Copying of Copyrighted Works for Purposes Other
Than for Profit or Sale Constitute Fair Use? An Economic Analysis of the Sony Betamax and
Williams & Wilkins Cases, 28 ST. LoUis U. L.J. 647,657 (1984). ("[E]xcluding those who are
unwilling to pay a positive price for public goods is difficult or impossible.")
107 Market failure was only one part of Professor Gordon's test for whether a use was a
fair use. Professor Gordon suggested a three-part test:
[F]irst, does a reason to mistrust the market appear?; second, is the transfer
to defendant value-maximizing, as determined by weighing plaintiff's injury
against defendant's social contribution?; third, if both the first and second
conditions are satisfied, would a grant of fair use cause substantial injury?
If it would not, and if the prior conditions are satisfied, then fair use should
be awarded.
Gordon, supra note 14, at 1626. Thus, in addition to the presence of a market failure, other
factors would need to be shown for the use to be fair.
10 Id, at 1627.
'09 Id. at 1630.
no Id.
'. Id. at 1631. Professor Gordon also lists anti-dissemination motives as a third type of
market failure. While the motives of a copyright owner may alter his or her willingness to
enter into a licensing agreement, a refusal by the copyright owner to permit a use is a type
of impossibility of achieving a market bargain. Id. at 1632-35.
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factors that cause market failure, courts have a difficult time
recognizing these types of market failures. As developed in Parts
III and IV of this Article, with the exception of cases involving
parodies, courts have focused their fair use inquiry in such a way
that if the first type of market failure is not present, i.e., transac-
tion costs for a particular bargain are minimal, it is highly unlikely
the court will find the use to be fair. This limited focus ignores the
second category of market failure, a category that is much more
important to the primary purpose of copyright.'12
III. FAIR USE IN THE COURTS
Courts have focused their analysis of fair use cases mainly on
two issues: money and the transformative nature of the use at
issue. This analysis typically results in a finding of fair use only
if there is a new work created and if there is no perceived impact
on the market for the copyrighted work. Unfortunately, these
emphases have diminished the importance of certain kinds of non-
transformative uses in the scheme of copyright. These emphases
have permitted money to be the driving force behind copyright. Yet
the main emphasis should be on the constitutionally mandated goal
of the progress of knowledge and learning."3  As discussed in
Section IV, the problem becomes particularly acute with the recent
willingness of courts to consider the "lost" permission fees that
copyright owners want to charge for certain uses as evidence of
harm to the markets for the copyrighted work.
A. THE EMPHASIS ON MONEY
The emphasis on money in fair use analysis is not entirely an
aberration of the lower courts. The fair use analysis codified in
112 The possible exception is parody which has elements of both types of market failure
present: impossibility of bargain due to anti-dissemination motives of copyright owners and
high external benefits and nonmonetizable social values. See Alfred C. Yen, When Authors
Won't Sell: Parody, Fair Use, and Efficiency in Copyright Law, 62 U. CoLO. L. REv. 79
(1991).
" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the
four factor fair use analysis must be undertaken "in light of the purposes of copyright."
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994).
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section 107 involves an examination of the four factors listed in
that section."4  While the four factors are not meant to be
exclusive, and courts are permitted to consider other factors as
well," 5 cases rarely go beyond the four factors. Of the four
factors enumerated in section 107, two focus on monetary issues.
The first factor looks at "the purpose and character of the use,
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes," while the fourth fair use factor
examines "the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work."" 6
The use of presumptions is one way in which courts overly stress
money. Courts apply a presumption of unfairness for commercial
uses under the first factor: if a use is found to be commercial, the
use is said to be presumptively unfair."' Courts also apply a
presumption of market harm under the fourth factor for uses that
are found to be commercial."' Although both of these presump-
tions have been rejected by the Supreme Court as inappropri-
ate, 19 lower courts continue to employ them. 2 '
l" 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
"1 Section 107 uses the word "include" which is expressly defined in the Copyright Act
to be "illustrative and not limitative." Id. at § 101. The four fair use factors have been
described as "redundant, interdependent, and to some extent, irrelevant." Comment, The
Two Strands of the Fair Use Web: A Theory for Resolving the Dilemma of Music Parody, 54
OHIO ST. L. J. 227, 246 (1993) (arguing that the four factors really soil down to two inquiries:
the social value of the use and the economic harm from consumer substitution).
" 17 U.S.C. § 107 (emphasis added). The two monetary based factors harken back to
the judicial fair use doctrine of Folsom, seeking to determine "the degree inwhich the use
may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original
work." Campbell, 510 U.S. at 576 (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901)).
1.7 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,448 (1984) (noting that
if the use was "for a commercial or profit making purpose, such use would presumptively be
unfair."); Princeton Univ. Press. v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1386 (6th
Cir. 1996) (en banc) (finding a presumption of unfairness because the use was held to be
commercial); Los Angeles News Serv. v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791, 798, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1026,
1033 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Sony). But see Campbell, 510 U.S. at 572 (reversing lower court
for applying presumptions in fair use analysis).
18 See, e.g., National Rifle Assoc. of Am. v. Handgun Control Fed'n of Ohio, 15 F.3d 559,
561, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1634, 1636 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting that the commercial nature of
a use creates a presumption on the fourth factor); Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1386.
, Campbell, 510 U.S. at 581,583-85,590-91. The Court explained the Sony analysis and
stated that the only presumption that is appropriate is a presumption of market harm when
the defendant has copied an entire work verbatim for a commercial purpose because such
28
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In addition to the statutory language, the Supreme Court, in one
of its first fair use cases after passage of the 1976 Copyright Act,
stated that the fourth factor was "perhaps the most important
[factor]."121 While in its most recent fair use case, Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose, that language is notably absent, 122 the lower courts
continue to adhere to the dicta of earlier Supreme Court decisions
and over-emphasize the fourth factor, thus making the monetary
inquiry a virtual litmus test that must be passed before a use is
even eligible to be found a fair use. Even after the Supreme
Court's tempered language in Campbell, the lower courts continue
to view the fourth factor as the most important, or in the words of
one court, at least "primus inter pares." 123
The emphasis on money in two of the four factors should not be
that surprising given their origin. The four fair use factors owe
their origin to Folsom and thus reflect an analysis that tends to
expand copyright owners' rights, not contract them. 124  Now,
however, fair use plays a different role in copyright law. Fair use
no longer is meant to expand the rights of copyright owners, but is
meant to function as a limitation on those rights. Therefore, courts
copying serves as a replacement in the market for the original copyrighted work. Id. at 591.
12 See, e.g., Los Angeles News Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d 1119, 1123, 42
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1080, 1083 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that a finding of commercial use
"may give rise to a presumption or inference of harm."); Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at
1386; Lamb v. Starks, 949 F. Supp. 753, 757 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Oasis Publ'g Co., Inc. v. West
Publ'g Co., 924 F. Supp. 918, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1271 (D. Minn. 1996); ITAR-TASS
Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). Other
courts have expressly recognized the Supreme Court's rejection of the use of presumptions.
See, e.g., Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 948 F. Supp. 1214, 1219, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1598 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that while the Supreme Court "roundly rejected" the use
of presumptions, the presumptions "substantially simplified the fair use analysis"), affd 1998
WL 73116 (2d Cir. 1998); Belmore v. City Pages, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 673,34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1295 (D. Minn. 1995).
" Sony, 464 U.S. at 476 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The court repeated this language
with increased vigor in a later opinion stating that the fourth factor was "undoubtedly the
single most important element of fair use" analysis. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).
122 510 U.S. 569, 590-94 (1994); see also American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60
F.3d 913, 926 (2d Cir. 1994) (commenting on the notable absence of reference to the fourth
factor as "the most important' in the Campbell decision).
"Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1385. See also Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of
Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEx L. REV. 989, 1077 (1997) (noting the
tendency of the courts to focus primarily on market harm "to the exclusion of all else").
m See supra Part II.C.
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must be vigilant not to allow the rights of copyright owners to
swallow the rights of users. As the Copyright Act provides, the
rights of copyright owners are subject to the rights of users, 12
and the rights of fair use exists notwithstanding the rights of
copyright owners. 121 An over-emphasis on monetary issues can
inappropriately skew the fair use analysis to favor the rights of
copyright owners. This is especially likely if the mere existence of
a permission system creates a legally relevant market which can be
harmed by the failure to pay the fees demanded.127
B. EMPHASIS ON TRANSFORMATIVE USES
In addition to focusing on money, courts usually categorize
alleged fair uses into one of two types: transformative uses and
non-transformative uses. A transformative use involves the use of
elements or portions of a pre-existing work in a new work that
recasts or transforms the earlier work in some way.128  A non-
transformative use, on the other hand, does not involve any
transformation of the authorship elements of the pre-existing work.
Courts view transformative uses more favorably and allow a
greater latitude under fair use for such uses. Non-transformative
uses, on the other hand, are disfavored, and courts permit a much
narrower scope of use as fair uses, if any non-transformative use is
permitted at all. The common explanation for this treatment of
different kinds of uses is that transformative uses are creating new
works that are adding value to society.' 29
The current focus on transformative uses, as that phrase is used
by courts and commentators, can be misleading. As the Supreme
Court recognized in Sony, there are uses that, while not transform-
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
17 U.S.C. § 107-120 (1994).
1
2 7 See infra Part IV.c.
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
" This focus on determining if the use is transformative is typically thought to examine
"whether the new work merely 'supersede[s] the objects' of the original creation ... or
instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first
with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what
extent the new work is transformative.'" Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 5:1
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ative, are nonetheless productive uses.'3° The examples given by
the Court in Sony include a teacher who copies to prepare lecture
notes or a teacher who copies for the sake of broadening his
personal understanding of his specialty.131  Additionally, in
Campbell, the Supreme Court specifically noted "[t]he obvious
statutory exception to this focus on transformative uses is the
straight reproduction of multiple copies for classroom distribu-
tion."13 2 Making multiple copies for classroom use is an example
of a productive, but non-transformative use.
Focusing on whether the use at issue is a transformative use of
a prior work can be a misleading focus in a fair use analysis.
Promoting the progress of knowledge and learning must be the
point of reference. What the Supreme Court in Sony referred to as
"productive use" should be the foCUS. 13 3 Obviously many transfor-
mative uses will be productive uses. The emphasis placed on the
transformative nature of the defendant's work in Campbell,
however, may induce lower courts to believe that if a use is not
transformative there should be no finding of fair use. 13 4 Such a
rule would harm the purpose of copyright and blatantly contradicts
the language of the section 107 which expressly contemplates that
"reproduction in copies," i.e., a non-transformative use, can be a fair
ISO Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 404 U.S. 417, 455 n.40 (1984).
Although courts and commentators sometimes use the terms "transformative use" and
"productive use" interchangeably, see, e.g., Lape, supra note 55, at 677 n.1; LEAFFER, supra
note 74, at 320-21 & n.17; American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 11,
23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1561 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aft'd, 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994), "productive use"
should have a broader meaning that connotes a use that furthers the purpose of copyright
law. A transformative use is typically a productive use, but not all productive uses are
transformative. The examples of productive uses given in Sony are illustrative: copying
works for personal edification by a teacher or a legislator. Sony, 464 U.S. at 455 n.40. No
transformation of the work occurs with these uses, but the use is productive nonetheless.
' Sony, 464 U.S. at 455 n.40.
132 Campbell, 510 U.S. 579 n.11.
'33 Sony, 464 U.S. at 455 n.40.
' See Pierre N. Leval, Fair Use Rescued, 44 U.C.LA. L. REV. 1449, 1464-65 (1995)
(asserting that, after Campbell, if a use is both non-transformative and commercial then it
is unlikely to be a fair use). The focus on transformative use in a case involving parody is
quite understandable. It should not, however, translate into primary focus in all fair use
cases.
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use."~ Reproduction of a work in copies, in most cases, does not
involve any transformation of the work.
Rather than categorizing an alleged fair use as transformative or
non-transformative, courts should focus on understanding the
ability of the use to promote the progress of knowledge and
learning. This promotion can certainly occur as a result of the
production of a new work-a transformative use. It can also occur
through other non-transformative productive types of uses, such as
photocopying a portion of a work in connection with research or
teaching, as recognized by the Supreme Court in Sony.'3s
IV. FAIR USE AND "LOST" PERMISSION FEES
While courts have been putting a significant emphasis on
monetary concerns and on whether a use is transformative in
nature, more disturbing is the recent willingness of courts to
consider as evidence of economic injury the money that the
defendant did not pay to the copyright owner, so long as a per-
mission system to administer the collection of those fees exists. 37
Two recent circuit court cases in which the existence of a permis-
sion system was an important, if not determinative, factor in
finding the use at issue to be an infringement and not a fair use
are Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services,
Inc. ,13  and American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc.139  In
'm 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). The House Report indicates that "the reference to fair use 'by
reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means' is mainly intended to make
clear that the doctrine has as much application to photocopying and taping as to older forms
of use." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976).
Sony, 464 U.S. at 455 n.40.
The phrasing of the fourth fair use factor is largely to blame. The fourth factor directs
the court to consider "the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.' 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). The fourth statutory factor should be read
conjunctively, examining the effect of the use upon 1) the potential market for the
copyrighted work, and 2) the value of the copyrighted work. Similarly, Folsom's formulation
should be read to mean the degree to which the use may 1) prejudice the sale of the original
work, 2) diminish the profits of the original work, or 3) supersede the objects of the original
work. As discussed above, Folsom was a case establishing fair use as a limitation on the
rights of users to make a "fair abridgment" of work, not a case establishing fair use as a
limitation on the rights of copyright owners. See, supra Part I.C.
138 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1336 (1997).
'" 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1995).
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both cases the fact that the copyright owner had set up a system to
charge for the type of use at issue heavily influenced the outcome
of the case. Both cases show the application of the market failure
theory of fair use. Except, in both of these cases, the courts
narrowed the market failure theory to include only one type of
market failure and applied the theory in reverse, finding no fair use
because one type of market failure was not present.
The courts in these two cases were focusing on only one type of
market failure, high transaction costs, without fully recognizing the
importance of other types of market failures. While one type of
market failure may be cured by the existence of a permission
system, other kinds of market failures may remain. A permission
system can cure the market failure that results from high transac-
tion costs associated with the completion of the negotiation of the
transaction relative to the expected benefit from the transac-
tion.140 A permission system, however, does not cure the market
failure that exists when there are diffuse external benefits that
cannot be efficiently internalized in any bargained-for exchange.
This kind of market failure deserves particular notice when
examining non-transformative uses of a copyrighted work being
made in the context of research, scholarship, or education. The
benefits of certain kinds of uses in these contexts can be immense.
But the benefits also can be external to the researcher, scholar,
teacher or student. These kinds of non-transformative uses that
have significant external benefits represent the enhancement of the
core goal of copyright by furthering the progress of knowledge and
learning. In the context of non-transformative uses, curing the
140 In the context of copyright and fair use the transaction costs include such items as
tracking down the current copyright owner, or more specifically, because the rights under
copyright law are divisible, the individual or entity that owns the specific copyright right at
issue. While the copyright notice may indicate who, at one time, held the copyright in a
particular work, it is common that such copyrights are bought and sold and divided, with
only some of these transactions being recorded in the copyright office. Additionally, after
1989, copyright notice is not required for a work to be protected by copyright. Additional
transaction costs also exist in negotiating the actual price to be paid for the use and the
scope of the permission granted.
If the use for which permission is sought is the making of a movie based on a book, the
benefits, or at least the perceived benefits, may outweigh the transaction costs associated
with obtaining permission. If, however, the use at issue is making a photocopy of an article
for a research file, in most instances the benefits of that particular use for the user will not
outweigh the transaction costs of obtaining permission.
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high transaction costs that might be associated with a particular
use does not end the threat of a market failure due to the inability
to internalize diffuse yet significant external benefits.
Before briefly reviewing each of these two cases, it is important
to recognize that the application of a principle of market failure to
fair use involves an inherent circularity. In order to determine
whether a market failure exists, one must first assume an ability
to have a "market," that someone has a right that can be sold. In
the context of copyright and fair use, applying market failure
analysis must therefore begin with the assumption that the
copyright owner has a right to control a particular use which forms
the market that has failed. 141 If fair use is a right guaranteed to
users of copyrighted works, then there is no right of a copyright
owner around which a "market" can form. While there is always
the potential for a market because the law can define a right thus
creating a market, the initial circularity in discussing any fair use
stems from the fact that there are competing but ill-defined rights
that overlap in such a way as to make the parties to any potential
exchange unsure of who holds which rights.
A. PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS V. MICHIGAN DOCUMENT SERVICES,
INC.
At issue in Princeton University Press was the reproduction of
multiple copies of excerpts of copyrighted works for classroom use.
The plaintiffs, publishers and copyright owners by assignment from
the authors of the copyrighted works, strategically chose to sue only
the commercial copyshop which made the photocopies requested by
the professors. The publishers did not name the professors who
selected the material to be copied, or the students who were
enrolled in the professors' classes and purchased their copies of the
reading assignments from the copyshop. 142 This strategic naming
of the parties permitted the publishers to claim that the use was
commercial, despite the fact that the copyshop did not make any
14 See Raskind, supra note 6, at 624.
142 The defendant made no sales to the public, only students enroiled in the course were
permitted to purchase the "coursepacks," and any copies not purchased at the end of a
semester were discarded. Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1398 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
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"use" of the authorship, in the sense of selecting what part of the
work to photocopy or offering the copies for sale to the public."
13
Raising the specter of commerciality permitted the publishers to
prevail on the first factor of section 107.14
To satisfy the requisite of market harm the publishers relied
solely on the "lost" permission fees that they would have charged
for the use had the defendant sought permission. The publishers
did not produce any evidence of harm to the market for the work
itself, i.e., lost sales of the book from which the excerpts were
taken, or of harm to the market for any derivative work as that
term is defined by the copyright act, for example harm to the
market for published anthologies which used excerpts from the
copyrighted works. The affidavits filed in the case showed that the
professors who selected the material were never going to assign the
excerpted readings if it meant requiring the students to purchase
the books. 45
The district court's decision finding the defendants liable for
copyright infringement was reversed by a split panel of the Sixth
Circuit that found defendants' activities constituted fair use. The
14 This point was not lost on one of the dissenting judges. In his dissent, Judge Ryan
carefully analyzed who the "user" of the work really was and recognized the difference
between a company that selects the material to be copied or that sells copies to the public
and the service company that merely copies specific items only upon individual requests of
the user of the material. Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1401-03 (Ryan, J., dissenting)
(noting that "[n]either the language of section 107 nor simple common sense warrant
examining the production of multiple copies in a vacuum and ignoring their educational use
on the facts of this case").
14 The strategic naming of the commercial enterprise providing the photocopying service
assisted the publishers in obtaining a ruling of infringement. Thus, it is possible to argue
that the result in the case is only applicable to commercial copyshops preparing coursepacks
and would not be applicable to nonprofit education institutions making their own copies "in-
house." Educational institutions, however, are risk adverse entities and as a whole err on
the side of caution, adopting policies consistent with the case law involving commercial
enterprises. This unwillingness to exercise their fair use rights leads to the de facto
application of the case law to noncommercial enterprises which will result in their de jure
application as well. See infra Part IV.C2. As evidence of the publishing communities'
assertion of entitlement to royalties even when the copies are made by the nonprofit
educational institution the Copyright Clearance Center ("CCC") has established its Academic
Permissions Services which permits professors to request permission to make copies of
material for classroom handouts and permits the CCC to collect the royalties for such use.
See Academic Permissions Service (visited Aug. 24, 1997) <http'//www.copyright.com>.
" Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1272, Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document
Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (No. 94-1778) (affidavit of Michael C. Dawson).
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panel's decision was vacated and the case reheard en banc. The en
banc majority of the court of appeals rejected the defendants' claim
of fair use. Because each of the publishers had set up a "depart-
ment that processes requests for permission to reproduce portions
of copyrighted works,"14" the court found that the publishers had
shown harm to a "market" when those fees were not paid by the
defendant.
This is circular reasoning at its best. The plaintiff claims to be
economically injured because the plaintiff wanted to be paid for a
certain use and was not paid.147 The ability to prove economic
injury merely by showing that one has established a system to
charge for a certain kind of use portends that a smart copyright
owner will always prevail on the fourth fair use factor.148 With
courts treating market harm as the most important fair use factor,
the analysis used by the en banc majority tips the scales unduly
against the would-be fair user.
The Sixth Circuit found that not only did such "market harm"
weigh against fair use, but that because of the "potential for
destruction" of the "market" for permission fees, it was enough to
"negate fair use."49 Additionally, because it held the use to be
non-transformative, the majority found the three other statutory
factors "considerably less important.""5
B. AMERICAN GEOPHYSICAL UNION V. TEXACO ("TEXACO")
Texaco began as a class action lawsuit by 83 publishers of
scientific and technical journals against Texaco, which employs 400
to 500 research scientists. The publishers alleged that the
photocopying of journal articles by the researchers constituted
copyright infringement. Texaco claimed, among other defenses,
that the scientists' actions constituted fair use. The parties
16 Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1384.
147 See discussion infra Part V.C.1.
See discussion infra Part IV.C.4.
'
4 Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1388.
150 Id. at 1388. This, despite the fact that two years earlier the Supreme Court had
stated that "the obvious statutory exception to this focus on transformative uses was the
straight reproduction of multiple copies for classroom distribution." Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 n.11 (1994).
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stipulated that the photocopy practices of one scientist would be
chosen at random as representative of the practices of all the
scientists at Texaco. For consideration by the judge, the publishers
selected from the chosen scientist's files photocopies of eight
particular articles from the Journal of Catalysis.
The Second Circuit stated that determining whether Texaco's
practices constituted fair use included "the question of whether
such institutional, systematic copying increases the number of
copies available to scientists while avoiding the necessity of paying
for license fees or for additional subscriptions."151 In other words,
the court considered relevant not only the harm to the market for
the only mode in which the work was available to the public,
journal subscriptions, but also the harm to fees generated by
granting permissions for users to photocopy portions of the journal.
The District Court had determined that in the absence of being
allowed to copy the individual articles, Texaco would not have
purchased back issues and would not have significantly increased
the number of subscriptions, but that Texaco "would increase the
number of subscriptions somewhat."'52 The Second Circuit held
that this finding did "not strongly support either side with regard
to the fourth factor.""
Instead of leaving the analysis of the fourth factor at a draw,
which sometimes will be the result in fair use cases, the Second
Circuit proceeded to examine the claim of lost permission reve-
nues.' The court did recognize that not all licensing revenues
should be considered, but formulated the criterion as being "[o]nly
an impact on potential licensing revenues for traditional, reason-
able, or likely to be developed markets should be legally cognizable
when evaluating a secondary use's 'effect upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work.' "15 In Texaco, the Second
Circuit maintained that "it is sensible that a particular unautho-
l American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 916 (2d Cir. 1994).
SAmerican Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), affd,
60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).
53 Texaco, 60 F.3d at 929.
1'4 The District Court held that whatever combination of procedures Texaco used to obtain
authorized copies, "the publishers' revenues would grow significantly." Texaco, 802 F. Supp.
at 19.
'5 Texaco, 60 F.3d at 930.
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rized use should be considered 'more fair' when there is no ready
market or means to pay for the use, while such an unauthorized
use should be considered 'less fair' when there is a ready market or
means to pay for the use."' The court concluded that because
a market for licensing photocopying existed it was appropriate to
consider the potential licensing revenues for the use at issue.157
Primarily as a result of the "lost" licensing revenues, the court held
that the plaintiffs had demonstrated substantial harm on the
fourth factor. 1" This, coupled with a finding of no transformative
use, led the Second Circuit to reject Texaco's fair use claim.'59
C. PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM ALLOWING "LOST" PERMISSION FEES
TO CONSTITUTE MARKET HARM
Restricting fair use to only those situations where an efficient
mechanism for obtaining permission does not yet exist trivializes
the importance of fair use in a democratic society and the impor-
tance of fair use in furthering the goal of copyright law."s  In
light of the growing number of lower court precedents, copyright
owners may now more easily convince courts that, because they
were not paid the fees they demanded, they were legally injured.
This view of fair use creates several distinct problems.
Problem 1: Inherent Circularity. The argument that "lost"
permission fees are proof of fourth factor harm has as its premise
the legal conclusion at issue: that the use at issue is not a fair use
and, therefore, the owner is allowed to charge permission fees for
such use. If a copyright owner labeled his permission system "the
'5 Id. at 931.
157 Id. at 930.
'5 Id. at 931.
'1 Id.
60 While it is tempting to say that the transaction costs in both Princeton University
Press and Texaco were reduced to an acceptable level, the courts in both cases overlooked
elements of transactions costs that were not eliminated through the permission systems. In
Texaco, the dissent fully explained the failings of the Copyright Clearance Center's ("CCC")
permission systems in the context of corporate copying, concluding that the CCC's systems
would require a copyright lawyer posted at each copy machine. Id. at 936-39 (Jacobs, J.,
dissenting). In the coursepack context, there are additional transaction costs involved in
obtaining permission for various excerpts that are not eliminated by a permission system.
See Winslow, supra note 93, at 793-94 (giving an example of how transaction costs could
prevent an outcome beneficial to all parties concerned).
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department for charging fees for criticism, comment, news report-
ing, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship and research"'6 1 then the attempt to control fair use
would be more obvious. Consideration of the permission fees
allegedly "lost" in determining whether a use is a fair use is
inappropriate because no fees are required unless the use is not a
fair use.6
2
Other courts have, appropriately, rejected claims of "lost"
permission fees as relevant harm to the market for the copyrighted
work in a fair use analysis. Over twenty years ago, the U.S. Court
of Claims recognized that there can be no claim for permission fees
unless the use at issue would otherwise be an infringement:
It is wrong to measure the detriment to plaintiff by loss
of presumed royalty income-a standard which neces-
sarily assumes that plaintiff had a right to issue licens-
es. That would be true, of course, only if it were first
decided that the defendant's practices did not constitute
"fair use." In determining whether the company has
been sufficiently hurt to cause these practices to become
"unfair," one cannot assume at the start the merit of the
plaintiffs position, i.e., that plaintiff had the right to
license. That conclusion results only if it is first deter-
mined that the photocopying is "unfair.""6
161 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
SCampbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,585 n.18 (1994) (stating that "[i]f the
use is otherwise fair, then no permission need be sought or granted"). In the Princeton
University Press case, one of the dissenting judges recognized that '[s]imply because the
publishers have managed to make licensing fees a significant source of income from
copyshops and other users of their works does not make the income from the licensing a
factor on which we must rely in our analysis. If the publishers have no right to the fee in
many of the instances in which they are collecting it, we should not validate that practice
by now using the income derived from it to justify further imposition of fees." Princeton
Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1397 (6th Cir. 1996) (Merritt,
J., dissenting). See also Stallman, supra note 11, at 295 ("The claim is begging the question
because the idea of 'loss' is based on the assumption that the publisher 'should have got
paid.' ").
'63 Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1357 n.19, 180 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 49, 58 n.19 (Ct. Cl. 1973), affd by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975). The
Supreme Court's split in this case, and its finding of fair use in the Sony case have been
attributed to the Court not being "able to assess with any degree of assurance the harm from
complete copying for purposes other than profit or sale." Cirace, supra note 106, at 650.
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A panel of the Sixth Circuit also recognized the inherent
circularity of considering permission fees that copyright owners
desire to charge when trying to determine if the use at issue is a
fair use.
Evidence of lost permission fees does not bear on market
effect. The right to permission fees is precisely what is
at issue here. It is circular to argue that a use is unfair,
and a fee therefore required, on the basis that the
publisher is otherwise deprived of a fee. The publishers
must demonstrate a likelihood that MDS's use of the
excerpts replaces or affects the value of the copyrighted
works, not just that MDS's failure to pay fees causes a
loss of fees, to which the plaintiffs may or may not have
been entitled in the first instance.'"
This panel opinion was reversed by an eight to five majority of the
en banc court of the Sixth Circuit.'6
The en banc majority felt that the "circularity argument proves
too much" in that one could carry it to the extreme: copying an
entire book and offering it for sale to the public would harm the
permission market for such copying.'6 However, such copying
would not only harm the permission market,. it would have a
substantial impact on the primary market for the book itself.6 7
If an alleged infringer copied an entire book, the copyright owner
could show harm to the market for the copyrighted work without
any resort to a "lost" permission fees argument.
Permission systems, however, give a false sense of being able to assess such damage because
a dollar figure can be attached to the fee that the copyright owner would charge for such
copying.
'" Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., No. 94-1778, 1996 WL
54741, at *11 (6th Cir. Feb. 12, 1996) vacated and reh'ggranted, .77 F.3d 1528 (6th Cir. 1996)
(en banc) (emphasis added), affd in part and vacated in part, 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996)
(en banc).
99 F.3d at 1381.
1 Id. at 1387.
The market for the work itself is a much more important market to consider in a fair
use analysis. Treating the market for permission for particular kinds of uses as equally
significant to the market for the work itself leads to other problems such as permitting the
copyright owners to always prove market harm. See infra notes 178-181 and accompanying
text.
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In Texaco, the Second Circuit held that "[tihe vice of circular
reasoning arises only if the availability of payment is conclusive
against fair use."1 Aside from the fact that circular reasoning
should be rejected because it proves nothing, the circular reasoning
of "lost" permission fees will become conclusive on the fourth factor.
In analyzing fair use cases, courts have focused on monetary issues
and have repeatedly held the fourth factor to be the most important
fair use factor. Therefore, allowing circular reasoning to determine
the fourth fair use factor will often result in circularity dictating
the outcome of a fair use case.
Problem 2: Bullies Dictate the Law. The Supreme Court has
said that in examining the fourth factor, the issue "is not whether
the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but whether the user
stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material
without paying the customary price." "' A price becomes custom-
ary only when a critical mass of users begins paying for a particu-
lar kind of use. If a copyright owner, or an industry of copyright
owners, convince enough users to pay for a certain type of use, then
the "price" becomes customary. Often the first users to pay the
requested fees are those copyright owners in the industry who,
through a gentlemen's agreement, have undertaken to pay fees.
For example, in the publishing industry, it became common for one
publisher to get permission and to pay for the right to incorporate
into a new work an excerpt from a previously published work. This
practice of seeking and obtaining permission became "customary"
and resulted in "permissions" departments at publishing compa-
nies. As a result, the publishing industry established the "custom-
ary" practice of paying a price for the use of excerpts of works in
subsequently published works.
Once established, permissions departments and their revenues
have constituted key factors in fair use cases resulting in the loss
of fair use rights and a corresponding increase in copyright owners'
rights. 170 An individual who has failed to pay the price desired
by the copyright owner who has an established permissions
10 American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 931 (2d Cir. 1994).
'SHarper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985) (emphasis
added).
170 Texaco, 60 F.3d at 930-31; Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc.,
99 F.3d 1381, 1387 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1336 (1997).
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department is seen as having failed to pay the customary price. A
finding that a defendant has failed to pay a customary price makes
it extremely difficult for a defendant to prevail in a claim of fair
use.
In addition to the "customary price" inquiry that exists in the
case law, another phrasing for the potential licensing markets that
are legally relevant is "traditional, reasonable or likely to be
developed markets."17' The development of a market in the
context of copyright requires a right that can be enforced, and
therefore sold. In the context of a use that is asserted to be fair, if
all a copyright owner must do is show that it is actively "requiring"
permission and some individuals are paying for the kind of use at
issue, those with economic resources, i.e., the financial ability to
litigate, will be able to bully their way into legally controlling that
use.
In the context of coursepacks, the publishing industry first sued
a group of professors, their university and the copyshop providing
photocopy services to the professors and their students. 72  This
litigation resulted in a quick settlement, 171 whereby the defen-
dants agreed to abide by guidelines strikingly similar to the
Classroom Guidelines. 74 This first litigation was an important
one. The settlement in that case became a stick that the publishers
could wield to insist on payment for the reproduction of excerpts in
"' Texaco, 60 F.3d at 930.
172 Addison-Wesley Publ'g Co. v. New York Univ., No. 82CIV8333, 1983 WL 1134
(S.D.N.Y. May 31, 1983).
17 The settlement was reached on April 7, 1983, less than four months after the suit was
filed. PATRY, supra note 47, at 211.174 AGREEMENT ON GUIDELINES FOR CLASSROOM COPYING IN NOT-FOR-PROFIT EDUCATION-
AL INSTITUTIONS WITH RESPECT TO BOOKS AND PERIODICALS, H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th
Cong. 2d Sess., at 68-71 (1976) (the "Classroom Guidelines"). The Classroom Guidelines,
which became part of a committee report, was developed by an ad hoc committee
representing various interest groups. Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and
Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 875-77 & n.133 (1987). While the ad hoc
committee did include some representatives of the education community, the guidelines
themselves were opposed by major groups representing higher education. H.R. REP. No. 94-
1476 at 72 (noting strong opposition from the American Association of University Professors
and the Association of American Law Schools). Although the guidelines purport to "state the
minimum and not the maximum standards of educational fair use," courts have effectively
turned them into the extent of permissible copying in an educational setting. Princeton
Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1390-91.
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coursepacks. 75 In this way, the publishers were able to establish
a "market" for licensing excerpts for coursepacks.
The evolution of the coursepack permission systems highlights
the importance of the first test cases. Whoever wins those first
cases effectively draws the line for fair use. The fear of litigation
by most copyright defendants, and their willingness to settle when
sued by economically powerful copyright owners, affects not only
their rights but the rights of others seeking to make similar kinds
of uses of copyrighted works. 17
6
Problem 3: Fair Use Becomes An Inquiry Into the Point of Non-
Use. In addition to adopting the circular reasoning inherent in
accepting "lost" permission fees as evidence of market harm, the en
banc majority in Princeton University Press turned that circularity
argument on its head. The majority faulted the defendants for
failing to provide proof that the professors would not have assigned
"7' An egregious example of the wielding of the copyright stick by the publishing industry
can be found in a 1993 letter from the Association of American Publishers' "Director of
Copyright Compliance' to Bel-Jean Copy/Print Center, reprinted in L. Ray Patterson,
Copyright and 'the Exclusive Right" ofAuthors, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, at 44-48 (1993). The
letter asserts copyright in plays written by British playwrights and first published in the
1700s. Copyright in such works, if it ever existed, had long expired. Nonetheless, the letter
threatens suit, citing Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphic Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 18
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1437 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) and the district court opinion in Princeton University
Press, and demands $2,500 and an agreement to not engage in copying beyond that described
in the Classroom Guidelines in order to avoid a lawsuit. See also Paul J. Heald, Payment
Demands for Spurious Copyrights: Four Causes of Action, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 259 (1994)
(discussing several examples of assertions of copyright ownership in works that are no longer
subject to copyright protection).
7 This problem with the development of markets for new uses of copyrighted works has
led one lawyer to comment that educators, by not standing up to publishers' insistence on
payment for multiple copies for classroom use were "squandering their legal birthright[s].'
David W. Stowe, JUST DO IT: How to Beat the Copyright Racket, LINGUA FRANCA, Dec.
1995, at 32, 37. One of the dissenting judges in the Princeton University Press case asserted
that:
Simply because the publishers have managed to make licensing fees a
significant source of income from copyshops and other users of their works
does not make the income from the licensing a factor on which we must rely
in our analysis. If the publishers have no right to the fee in many of the
instances in which they are collecting it, we should not validate that practice
by now using the income derived from it to justify further imposition of fees.
Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1397 (6th Cir. 1996)
(Merritt, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1336 (1997).
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the excerpts if it meant their students 7" would have to pay
permission fees in order to make those copies. Thus, the majority
wanted to see an "unwillingness to pay" as evidence of lack of
market harm. Implicitly the majority assumed it was possible that
the professors might have assigned the excerpts even if their
students had to pay permission fees.'"8 Presumably the majority
thought that the copyright owners might have been injured by not
having received those fees the students might have been willing to
pay.
The desire of the Court to have the defendants prove an unwill-
ingness to pay the fees demanded makes the fair use inquiry turn
on whether the user is resigned to do without access to, or use of,
the work. Requiring defendants to prove an unwillingness to pay
destroys the very purpose of fair use, access and use, and further
shows the circularity of the "lost" permission fees argument. Such
a requirement makes "fair use" turn on the point of non-use.
Under such analysis, fair uses would be only those uses for which
a user would not be willing to pay. The effect of this would be that
the most important types of uses would be denied fair use protec-
tion.
Problem 4: The Fourth Factor Always Favors the Copyright
Owner, Making Permission Systems a Tool To Eliminate Fair Use.
Permitting a copyright owner's permission system to constitute
evidence of harm to the market for the copyrighted work, means
that the fourth factor will inevitably favor a plaintiff who possesses
the simple foresight to set up a mechanism to process requests for
permission to use a work.179 Courts view fair use as an affirma-
tive defense, placing the burden of proving such defense on the
defendant.'80 The burden on the fourth factor, to show "favorable
evidence about relevant markets,"'8 can be shifted to the plaintiff
177 The majority was concerned with the copyshop paying the fee, but any fees paid by the
copyshop would be passed on directly to the students enrolled in the course.
178 Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1388.
1 For example, a book could contain self addressed envelopes with simple instructions:
"Anytime you desire to copy any portion of this book, you must first send $X for each copy
of each page to the address listed below." A simple, efficient mechanism for obtaining
permission thus could be shown.
"o Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994).lei Id.
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if the court finds the use at issue is a non-commercial use.N2
Which party bears the burden of proof on the fourth factor often is
determinative of the fair use defense.
If the burden on the fourth factor is on the defendant, i.e., the
court finds defendant's use to be commercial, and a permission
system is a relevant market, it will be impossible for a defendant
to offer "favorable evidence" on that market. If the burden is on
the plaintiff, i.e., the court finds the use at issue to be non-com-
mercial, and the court permits the copyright owners to "prove"
fourth factor harm by simply informing the court that they have set
up a system to charge for certain uses and defendant refused to pay
for his or her use, all copyright holders could easily meet their
burden to show market harm.
The ability of the copyright owner to always prevail on the issue
of market harm is compounded by language in several Supreme
Court opinions. The Supreme Court has posited that "to negate
fair use one need only show that if the challenged use 'should
become widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market
for the copyrighted work.' "" This language has led lower courts
to consider the damage to the market for all potential uses of the
copyrighted work and not to focus on the more appropriate
consideration: the damage to the market for the copyrighted work.
If the use at issue is even just a single copy and the copyright
owner has a permission system in place which a court is willing to
consider as evidence of harm to the "potential market," not only
will the copyright owner be able to prove market harm, i.e., lost
permission fees, but pursuant to this test the copyright owner will
be able to "negate fair use" entirely."'
If a court accepts the view of fair use as permitted solely when
there is a market failure caused by high transaction costs, then
ms Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
lS Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 568 (1985) (quoting
Sony, 464 U.S. at 451). The majority in Princeton University Press described this test as
evocative of Kant's categorical imperative. Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1386.
1
" While the Sixth Circuit majority stated that "the availability of an existing system for
collecting licensing fees will not be conclusive," two paragraphs later it held that the
potential destruction of the permissions market was "enough, under the Harper & Row test,
'to negate fair use.'" Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1387-88. One of the dissenting judges
noted, this analysis "ceded benefits entirely to copyright holders when [courts] are actually
required to engage in 'a sensitive balancing of interests.'" Id. at 1404 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
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permission systems, because they can eliminate or drastically
reduce the transaction costs involved in obtaining permission, will
destroy fair use. Fair use, however, holds more meaning than
simply uses permitted when the transaction costs involved in
obtaining a bargained exchange are high.
Problem 5: Fair Use Becomes "Fared Use". Acceptance of the
"lost" permission fees argument permits copyright owners to
eliminate all fair uses, because fair use will be relegated to only
those uses for which the copyright owner declines to charge. In the
history of copyright development, copyright owners have desired to
expand their rights whenever possible. Today, many works already
display the erroneous assertion that "no portion of this work may
be used for any purpose without the permission of the copyright
owner."185 Couple such notice with pre-addressed envelopes
attached to the work"' and an adoption of the view that fair use
exists only when there is a market failure due to high transaction
costs, and soon fair use will no longer exist.
Indeed, the Sixth Circuit said as much when it stated that a
claim of lost permission fees would be discounted only if the
defendant has "filled a market niche that the [copyright owner]
simply had no interest in occupying."" 7 If, on the other hand, the
defendant is filling a market niche that the copyright owner is
"interested in occupying," then presumably the claim of fair use will
be rejected. Courts, however, seem to view the willingness to
establish a permission system as evidencing an interest in occupy-
ing the market niche for the use at issue. This creates an unac-
ceptable situation in which permission fees will never be discount-
le Examples of overly broad assertions of copyrights are numerous. One particularly
egregious example can be found in JOHN SHELTON LAWRENCE & BERNARD TIMBERG, FAIR
USE AND FREE INQUIRY: COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE NEW MEDIA (2d ed. 1989):
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic,
mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording, or otherwise, without
permission of the publisher.
Surely one could copy a phrase or a sentence without needing the permission of the
publisher, and, depending on the reason for such copying, even a paragraph could be
unquestionably permissible (if, for example, the paragraph was copied for criticism purposes).
See also Heald, supra note 175, at 259, 283-92 (citing examples of copyright assertions in
public domain works).
186 See supra note 179 (explaining hypothetical system for processing requests to copy).
187 Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1387.
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ed. If courts permit the mere existence of a permission system to
evidence a legally cognizable market in a fair use analysis, they are
unjustifiably allowing copyright owners to dictate whether a use is
fair. This will permit copyright owners to "permission" fair use out
of existence, creating "fared use" in its place.'"
Problem 6: Ignoring the Public Interest Nature of Copyright.
Viewing fair use as only those uses for which there is not an
efficient market for remuneration to the copyright owner ignores
that copyright law is vested with a public interest. This public
interest, embodied in fair use, is the source of Congress' power to
enact copyright. Depriving the public of its right to make fair uses
by allowing permission systems to negate fair use strips the public
interest from copyright.
This is a unique attribute of copyright: someone other than the
copyright owner has the right to use the authorship and the labor
embodied in the copyrighted work. This, however, is no accident.
The use of the fruit of another's labor is not "some unforeseen
byproduct of a statutory scheme." It is, rather, "the essence of
copyright," and a constitutional requirement. The primary
objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."" 9 If the copy-
right owner possesses the exclusive right to grant permission, that
owner possesses the power to deny permission.' 9
" A system of "fared use" in place of fair use in the digital environment is explored in
Tom Bell, Fair Use v. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights Management on
Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 101 (1998); but see Julie E. Cohen, A Right
to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright Management" in Cyberspace, 28 CONN.
L. REV. 981 (1996) (arguing that the systems geared toward "fared use" in the digital
environment may cause an unconstitutional invasion of privacy).
"' Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 349, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1275, 1279 (1991) (citations omitted).
" This is already happening in scholarship. For example, in a desire to not expose the
dark side of a company, recent requests to use portions of works in an examination of
historical topics have been refused by corporations. Stowe, supra note 176, at 35. Also,
examinations of popular culture are hampered by refusals to grant permission for the
reprinting of portions of contemporary song lyrics and copyrighted images. Id.
Today courts are faced with copyright owners seeking to control the use of smaller and
smaller portions of works. In the age of computers and the Internet, copyright owners will
have the ability, if they do not already, to monitor the use of even the smallest portion of a
work accessed electronically. Computers give copyright owners the tools to know when
someone has accessed a chapter, a page, a paragraph, a sentence, or even a phrase.
Computers also allow copyright owners to create systems to monitor those uses and charge
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The fact that copyright law guarantees certain rights to the users
of copyrighted works does not mean that rewards to authors do not
serve a purpose. It means that those rewards should not be the
pivotal point in a fair use analysis. Instead, the rewards to
copyright owners should be carefully balanced against the public
benefits of fair use: access to works, dissemination of information,
and the promotion of learning through a variety of uses.19'
V. A DIFFERENT KIND OF MARKET FAILURE: THE INABILITY
To INTERNALIZE DIFFUSE EXTERNAL BENEFITS
The cases that have found that "lost" permission fees constitute
market harm do not bode well for the right of fair use.1 92 The
ability to use "permission systems" as proxies for economic injury
neglects a fundamental aspect of the purpose behind the fair use
doctrine in today's copyright law: to permit uses whose external
benefits outweigh any perceived damage to the creators' incentive
to create, regardless of whether the copyright owner would like to
be paid for a particular use and regardless of whether the copyright
owner has established a system to collect such payments.'93
the user for increasingly smaller percentages of works.
" As one of the dissenting judges in the Princeton University Press case described the
majority opinion: 'Mis case presents for me one of the more obvious examples of how
laudable societal objectives, recognized by both the Constitution and statute, have been
thwarted by'a decided lack of judicial prudence." Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1393
(Martin, J., dissenting).
1 Cases like Williams & Wilkins diminished the ability of copyright proprietors to seek
greater returns with advancing technology, in favor of the "progress of science and arts."
Raskind, supra note 6, at 619. Now, however, it appears that the courts have favored the
illusory threat to the desired interests of the individual proprietor at the expense of the
progress of science and arts.
'" This type of approach to fair use cases can be categorized as the "public benefit
approach" to fair use. The public benefit approach "will excuse a use, even in the absence
of transaction costs, if the social benefit of the use outweighs the loss to the copyright
owner." 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 10.4 (1996). The public benefit approach is
contrasted with the private benefit approach which "excuses uses that the copyright owner
would have licensed but for insurmountable transactions costs." Id. See also Winslow, supra
note 93, at 809 ("If there is a likelihood that the copyright owner would have entered a
license, then the fair use of the work can be sanctioned based only on prohibitively high
transaction costs."). If, however, the ultimate purpose of copyright is to benefit society, and
fair use is to be analyzed "in light of the purposes of copyright," Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994), it only seems appropriate to use a public benefit
approach to fair use. These two approaches have also been referred to as the constitutional
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A. WHY EXTERNAL BENEFITS OF ALLEGED FAIR USES SHOULD BE
CONSIDERED IN A FAIR USE ANALYSIS
The fair use section of the Copyright Act has enumerated certain
uses that, according to the legislative history, were "the sorts of
copying that courts and Congress most commonly had found to be
fair uses." 94  The first sentence of § 107 provides that certain
uses of a work, including reproducing a work in copies, shall not be
an infringement and that a use "for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of
copyright."195 An examination of these enumerated uses reveals
a common thread: each one of these uses provides external societal
benefits far beyond the benefits to the individual who is making the
criticism, the comment, the news report or the individual who is
doing the teaching, the scholarship or the research."9 But these
societal benefits are impossible to internalize in any bargained-for
exchange between the copyright owner and the user.9 7 However,
theory of fair use and the market failure theory of fair use. Georgia Harper, Coursepacks
and Fair Use: Issues Raised by the Michigan Document Services Case (last modified March
4, 1997) <http'//www.utsystem.edu/OGC/IntellectualProperty/michigan.htm>. This Article
emphasizes that recognizing all types of market failures includes the constitutional or public
benefit approach to fair use.
"' Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577-78.
196 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
'" These external benefits are a type of externality. Externalities create a divergence
between private and social costs that occurs "when some activity of party A imposes a cost
or confers a benefit on party B for which Party A is not charged or compensated by (or
through) the price system.' A. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 105 (4th ed. 1932).
Because society as a whole will profit when external benefits are created, transactions
producing these benefits should be encouraged. Gordon, supra note 14, at 1630.
17 One way that externalities can be internalized is through transactions. The inability
to internalize external benefits is, itself, a result of prohibitively high transaction costs. In
the context of the types of uses enumerated in the first sentence of § 107, the transaction
costs involved in having each member of society pay for the incremental benefit they receive
as a result of another's use would be enormous.
Professor Gordon suggested that in addition to market failure, there would need to be a
social benefit to the use at issue in order for a use to be fair. Gordon, supra note 14, at 1626.
As demonstrated above, if the social benefits external to the bargain and the inability to
internalize those benefits are considered in the analysis of whether there is a market failure
present, then there is no need to have this additional requirement. Indeed, if the inability
to internalize external benefits were not considered, many uses would not meet the
requirement of Professor Gordon's test that a market failure be present.
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these external societal benefits are exactly the kind of benefit that
the Constitution requires copyright to encourage. The inability to
internalize significant external benefits is a type of market failure
that fair use must protect.
While the lower courts often are focused on the monetary
arguments made in copyright cases and the relative certainty that
an economic analysis provides, the Supreme Court has consistently,
and appropriately focused its fair use inquiry on the constitutional
goal of copyright. The Supreme Court has not only backed away
from earlier statements concerning the importance of the fourth
factor,19 but the Court has also refused to recognize fourth factor
market harm based solely on the argument that a copyright owner
desires to charge for the use at issue.1 The fact that a copyright
owner has been able to convince others to pay the fee demanded
and therefore now can claim to have a "workable" permission
system should not change the analysis. The Court's refusal to
recognize a mere desire to be paid as evidence of market harm
when a defendant does not meet that desire with cash emphasizes
the fundamental role that fair use plays in the scheme of copyright
law-permitting certain kinds of uses that can have significant,
diffuse, external benefits in society regardless of whether the
copyright owner would permit such a use or would like to be paid
for such a use.
However, lower courts often do not look beyond the parties
involved in a particular litigation in determining the benefits of a
particular use. With almost every kind of use there is some
perceived benefit to the user of the work. For example, the
professor who makes a copy of an article in order to prepare a
lecture for a class presumably benefits professionally by being a
See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
' In Campbell, the copyright owner of the song "Pretty Woman" argued that it had
shown fourth factor market harm because its market for permission fees for parody versions
of "Pretty Woman" was harmed as a result of the rap group 2 Live Crew "unauthorized'
recording of a parody version of the song. The Court refused to consider the parody market
as a market cognizable under copyright law. The court recognized that it was unlikely that
creators of imaginative works would participate in a market for uses that are critical of their
works. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994). In addition to
recognizing the external benefits gained by society when criticism and commentary is
permitted, the Court's decision also reflects the non-monetizable nature of the social value
of commentary and criticism.
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more prepared and therefore more effective teacher. Because the
user has derived some benefit from the use, it is tempting to say
that the user should, therefore, pay for that use-any use. Yet our
Copyright Act is not premised on a copyright owner receiving
compensation for any kind of a use that can be made of a work,
even if the use provides a benefit to the user. A copyright owner
should receive a fair remuneration. In addition to the benefit
gained by the individual user, with certain kinds of uses, there are
benefits to others as well. In the example given, a more significant
benefit of the professor's copying is better educated students who
then are better educated citizens. The inability of the professor to
capture that value represents the inability to internalize the
external benefits of that use.
Consider a scientist who finds an article of interest at a library,
and, instead of taking handwritten notes concerning the article on
a separate piece of paper, makes a copy of the article and then
highlights portions of it and makes notes in the margin. That copy
creates a benefit for the scientist: she may take it to her office or
laboratory and use that copy to further her research. But there are
other potential benefits of that use. If the scientist makes a further
advance in her studies because of her personal, accessible copy of
the article, there is also a gain to society as a whole. Depending on
the nature of her research, some of that social benefit might be
internalized, but some of that benefit may remain external.
For example, if the research culminated in a new cure for heart
disease, the sufferers of heart disease would pay for that new drug.
But society benefits by having more productive citizens who no
longer are hampered in their day-to-day activities. Society is also
benefited by permitting the resources that would otherwise still be
devoted to curing heart disease to be now invested in other projects.
Only part of the benefit to society, the amount paid by the sufferers
of the disease, is internalized directly by the scientist. Therefore,
the scientist making the copy would value the ability to make the
copy and to have it in her office or laboratory at one amount, X,
and would be willing to pay that amount. The scientist would also
be willing to pay an amount equal to the anticipated social value
that could be internalized (after discounting that value based on
the probability that the cure will come to fruition), Y1. The full
external social value of that use, Y2, will never be captured and
19971
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therefore the scientist would not be willing to include that amount
as part of the payment for the use. The scientist would be willing
to pay for the use at a price equal or less than X+Y1, 2°° which is
not the full value of the use. Yet, unless the copyright holder is
willing to accept X+Y1 or less, the use will not legally occur and
society will lose the benefit of that use.
While the above analysis may lead to a conclusion that if X+Y1
is large enough, then the user should pay for such use,20 1 there
are other kinds of uses where X+Y1 will be tremendously limited
yet Y2, the external benefit that cannot be internalized, will be
significant. Consider the classroom handouts that were at issue in
Princeton University Press. The value of those copies to the
individual students might be equal to or only slightly more than
the cost of the photocopying.2 2 One external benefit of that use,
however, is that we as a society gain significantly by a better
educated citizenry. Yet there is no way to internalize that external
benefit other than through increased government subsidy to
education.2 3 If permission fees are required for such copying, the
inability to internalize such benefit will result in classroom
handouts not being used as frequently or as effectively,20' and
"promises to hinder scholastic progress nationwide."25  Not only
do the students not receive that added educational experience, but
society as a whole suffers by a diminished educational experience
for all students.
'o These are necessarily oversimplified examples. The amount the scientist would be
willing to pay also would need to subtract the cost the scientist incurred in making her copy.
While this may seem to be a reasonable conclusion, notes 204"-208 and accompanying
text, infra, explain why that might not be the case.
' Coursepacks are often used in addition to the assigned text books for a course. The
material in the coursepacks is also usually available on reserve at the library for the student
to read.
' A system of taxing all members of a society and then using the revenue to target
certain activities is one way to internalize diffuse external benefits, albeit a gross estimate
of benefits received and contributed.
2' A recent example at a law school involved a constitutional law professor who found
his students did not have sufficient understanding of the period in United States history
referred to as Reconstruction. He decided to handout to his students an exerpt from a book
on Reconstruction. The publisher, however, wanted over $200 for such one-time use of what
amounted to less than 10% of the book. These kinds of demands for classroom use of
excerpts of material have become commonplace.
' Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1393 (6th Cir.
1996) (Martin, J., dissenting).
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When there is a permission system in place and the defendant
has not availed himself or herself of that system the defendant
appears to be deliberately by-passing the market.206 However,
the market is not fully functioning because of the inability to
internalize the external benefit of certain types of uses.0 7
More important than both the value to the user of a particular
use and the value of the external benefits that can be internalized
is the economic fact that if left in the hands of private decision
makers, i.e., the market, too little of the goods that generate
external benefits will be consumed.208 In the context of copyright
and fair use, if left in the hands of the market, too few uses that
generate external benefits are likely to occur. When the market
reality concerning uses that create an external benefit is coupled
with a rule that requires payment for such uses, even less of those
types of uses will occur. These factors have not been reconciled by
those who assert that when a copyright owner would be willing to
license a particular use, fair use should only be found when there
are prohibitively high transaction costs.
2°
B. WHY COURTS UNDER-EMPHASIZE AND UNDERVALUE THE EXTERNAL
BENEFITS OF ALLEGED FAIR USES
When courts focus on economic analysis and market failure, they
often overlook or under-value the external benefits of a particular
use. Several factors contribute to this treatment of the external
benefits of a particular use. First, as discussed above, courts
generally fail to look beyond the parties to the particular lawsuit
when analyzing the harms and benefits in a case. Second, defining
public benefit is difficult. Third, placing a monetary value on
diffuse external benefits is often difficult. Sometimes this difficulty
' Gordon, supra note 14, at 1609 (noting that "[a] defendant who deliberately by-passes
the market is not likely to find the court willing to act as a resource-allocating mechanism").
m In order for market transactions to result in the maximization of value, one condition
that must be met is for all costs and benefits to be internal to the transaction. Id. at 1607.
"o Winslow, supra note 93, at 793 n.143; see also Gordon, supra note 14, at 1630 (noting
that the existence of external benefits fails to produce the optimal amount of benefit-
generating activity). The external benefit represents a social value. If that benefit is not
internalized, the amount of the benefit-producing activity will be less than the amount if its
full value could be captured.
'* Winslow, supra note 93.
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arises because the benefit is extremely small to each individual in
society. However, the aggregate benefit should be the focus. Other
times the difficulty will result fropa the external benefit being non-
monetizable.21 °
The structure and phrasing of the four factors in section 107 also
contribute to external benefits being overlooked. While the four
factors are not the only factors that a court may consider,21 1 a
court rarely strays beyond them. The only factor in which it
appears appropriate to consider the public benefit of a particular
use is the first factor. The first factor requires a court to consider
"the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purpos-
es ... ."212 The first factor directs a court to consider "the pur-
pose and character" of the use, an inquiry which would naturally
allow the court to consider the nature and amount of external
benefit of a particular use. Indeed, the inquiry into the transforma-
tive nature of the use does, in some way, measure the external
benefit of a use: the greater the transformation, the greater the
benefit to the storehouse of knowledge or the arts.213 But if the
use is found to be non-transformative, courts often do not recognize
that such use may still have significant external benefits. Instead,
when the use is deemed nontransformative, courts focus on a
different aspect of the "character of the use" inquiry: the commer-
cial or non-commercial nature of the use. Again, the natural
tendency of courts to focus on monetary issues is apparent but
unfortunate. This focus ignores the fundamental purpose of
copyright and a significant purpose of the fair use doc-
trine-permitting uses that have significant external benefits.
Another fundamental reason why courts may hesitate to fully
value, or to even recognize, the external benefits of a particular use
is fear of a slippery slope. Courts may feel that if one considers the
external benefits of a use as relevant to a fair use inquiry, because
all uses have an external benefit, then all uses of a work would be
2'0 The tendency of the law and economics approach to marginalize the non-monetizable
or less monetizable public interest has been extensively criticized elsewhere and is beyond
the scope of this paper. See Netanel, supra note 60, at 291 (citing additional sources).
211 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985).
211d. at 547 n.2; 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
21 See Lemley supra note 123.
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fair uses, a position which is untenable and would, in fact, defeat
the purpose of copyright. Nonetheless, this fear is unjustified given
the full scope of the fair use inquiry. For example, copying an
entire text of an article from a journal by a research scientist
should be viewed very differently than a copyshop's selecting
articles it believes will be the most interesting to scientists, making
copies of those articles, and offering the articles for sale to the
public. Both instances of copying result in better-educated citizens
and have external benefits. Nevertheless, the copyshop's activities
are invading a public sale and distribution market by selecting and
copying works and then publicly distributing the works for direct
commercial gain. This type of use engaged in by the copyshop, if
permitted without compensation to copyright owners, could create
a significant impact on the incentives to create and disseminate
new works.214
At the same time that courts may feel uneasy in fully valuing or
even recognizing the external benefits of a particular use, the cost
of such use to individual copyright owners is quite concrete,
especially if a permission system is considered in determining harm
to the market for the copyrighted work. Add to this seemingly
'
14 In a fair use analysis, such copying also is likely to reduce the number ofjournals that
are purchased-why buy the journal when you can just purchase only the articles you really
want to read?
The type of distinction between uses that is made in the text leads some to ask, why
should copyright owners be forced to subsidize education? See Richard Adelstein & Steven
Perez, The Competition of Technologies in Markets for Ideas: Copyright & Fair Use in
Evolutionary Perspective, 5 INT'L REV. L & ECON. 209 (1985); Linda J. Lacey, Of Bread and
Roses and Copyrights, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1532. The question can be presented differently by
asking, why should researchers or educators have to provide additional subsidies for the
creation and dissemination of new works? The notion that a copyright owner is somehow
subsidizing education if a particular educational use of a copyrighted work is a fair use starts
with the premise that the copyright owner is entitled to control all uses of a work.
Prohibiting such control, i.e., finding a use to be a fair use, then looks like a forced subsidy.
But the premise underlying copyright law in the United States is that copyright owners are
entitled to a fair remuneration. They are not entitled to profit from every kind of use of their
work.
While we often refer to copyright as property, "[it wears the property label uneasily."
Patterson, supra note 12, at 37. Copyright is more regulatory in nature. Id. at 41. It is a
limited statutory monopoly, with its scope defined by those rights that the public is willing
to cede in order to provide the incentive necessary to encourage the production of new works.
When copyright is viewed as property, court decisions become matters of the self-interest of
the owner of that property, with the results of those decisions favoring owners of copyrighted
works rather than the public good. Id. at 5.
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concrete injury the fact that there appears to be some benefit to the
user, and the idea that the user does not have to pay for that
benefit does not sit well with most courts. After all, courts are
familiar with resolving commercial disputes. If the defendant is
using the plaintiff's property without permission, the defendant will
have to pay for that use.215
Focusing on the money potentially lost by permitting a certain
use to be within the scope of fair use rights skews the fair use
analysis in favor of the copyright owner at the expense of the
fundamental goal of copyright law. Courts should instead focus on
what rule would best serve the public interest. Courts should ask
if the overall public is better served by permitting the kind of use
at issue without the obligation to pay the copyright owner, taking
into account the full social benefit of the use, or is the public
interest best served by the marginal increase in incentive to create
and disseminate new works that would result if the type of use at
issue required permission from the copyright owner?216 In exam-
ining fair use cases, courts should more seriously consider the list
of "favored" uses provided by Congress in section 107, especially
when the use at issue is a non-transformative use. This list should
be seen as a proxy for uses with large external benefits that cannot
be internalized. In the context of such uses, a court should not
permit the existence of a permission system to quell the inquiry
into other types of market failures that may exist.
215 The invidious nature of viewing copyright as property can be seen in the District
Court's decision in the Princeton University Press case finding the defendants guilty of willful
infringement.
[Defendants] proceeded recklessly at their own peril and should not be
surprised that they are now called upon to answer for this unjust enrichment.
... They clearly were doing it to realize profit for themselves. Their position
was unreasonable and it was a reckless disregard of the copyright holders'
property rights.
Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 855 F. Supp. 905, 912, 32
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1045, 1051 (E.D. Mich. 1994) aftd in part, rev'd in part, 99 F.3d 1381 (6th
Cir. 1996) (en banc). This strenuous ruling stemmed from the District Court Judge's view
of copyright as a property right, not a limited statutory monopoly. The language quoted
above is particularly harsh for a case that was reversed on appeal and then reheard en banc
resulting in a split among the judges with five judges dissenting, and even the en banc
majority finding that the defendants' actions did not constitute willful infringement.
218 In making this determination, the court should bear in mind that the revenue
potentially generated from an alleged fair use is in addition to the revenue generated by
sales of the copyrighted work itself.
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CONCLUSION
An evaluation of any fair use case "involves a difficult balance
between the interests of authors and inventors in the control and
exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one hand, and
society's competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information,
and commerce on the other hand."217 By permitting permission
systems to constitute evidence of market harm in a fair use
analysis, courts disproportionately skew the balance in favor of
copyright owners, at the expense of the interests of society.
The Constitution specifies the goal of copyright law in this
country: to promote the progress of knowledge and learning. The
first copyright law enacted in this country granted authors specific
and limited rights: to print, publish and vend their work. At that
time the law did not contemplate, and therefore did not give the
copyright owner the exclusive right to control other uses that could
be made of works, e.g., movie versions or other adaptations of
written works. Over the last 200 years copyright law has evolved
to protect a wide variety of uses of a work in a wide variety of
media. The statutory expansion of the rights of copyright owners
continues today, resulting in an increased importance of guaran-
teeing the rights of the users of copyrighted works through
doctrines such as fair use.
Because of the courts' focus on monetary concerns, fair use
continues to be a second-class citizen in the world of copyright law.
Courts often view invocation of the doctrine as a move by the
desperate copyright defendant, caught in the act of infringement,
looking for an excuse, instead of embracing fair use as the counter-
weight to the continued expansion of the copyright monopoly. In
most instances, fair use has become an illusory doctrine, touted by
the advocates of copyright expansion as a panacea of the fears of
the masses.
The market failure theory of fair use asserts that the right of fair
use should exist only when a failure in the market exists. The fact
that one type of market failure may have been cured through the
implementation of a permission system by the copyright holder
does not preclude, however, the presence of a different kind of
21 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
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market failure. If copyright is to remain true to its constitutionally
mandated goal, courts must be willing to recognize the most
important kind of market failure relevant to fair use: the inability
to internalize the external benefits of certain kinds of use. This
holds especially true for non-transformative uses in the context of
research, scholarship and teaching. If courts fully recognized the
type of market failure that fair use was best designed to remedy,
fair use would apply to more than just those uses from which
copyright owners are not interested in profiting. Instead, fair use
would achieve its important counter-balancing role in copyright:
guaranteeing rights of users in the face of the broader scope of
monopoly rights granted to copyright owners in order that copy-
right law fulfills its constitutionally mandated goal of promoting
knowledge and learning.
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